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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court long has recognized that parents have a
fundamental right to raise and care for their children.' Parental
rights should be terminated, therefore, only if the state can prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the parents are unfit,2 that the
children are neglected,3 or that other compelling circumstances
exist.4 In practice, however, the constitutional protections afforded
parental rights are less robust than first might appear, in part because
states have much discretion in determining the criteria for actual or
presumed unfitness. Further, because custody and visitation awards
often depend on the credibility, temperaments, and personalities of
those vying for custody, trial courts are given much discretion when
applying the relevant criteria, which creates even more potential for
abuse. Regrettably, as Bottoms v. Bottoms and other cases illustrate,
gay or lesbian parents and their children are among those who have
been victimized both by states' adopting custody criteria that punish
the parents rather than promote the children's best interests and by
1. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (stating that constitutional protection is afforded to family relationships and child
rearing); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 75--54 (1982) (holding that termination of parental
rights interferes with fundamental liberty interest and state must provide fundamentally fair
procedures when destroying familial bonds); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,
38 (1981) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (concluding that freedom of choice in family matters long
has been regarded as "fundamental liberty interest protected by Fourteenth Amendment");
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944) (recognizing certain private areas of family
life with which state cannot interfere); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)(holding that act requiring parents to send children to public schools "interfere(d] with liberty
of parents.., to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding right to raise children is liberty interest
guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment).
2. See Paul v. Steele, 461 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Il1. 1984) (holding that parental rights of
nonconsenting parent can be terminated only when parent found unfit); Sheppard v. Sheppard,
630 P.2d 1121, 1127 (Kan. 1981) (determining that natural parent's right to custody of child is
fundamental right that cannot be disturbed unless parent is found unfit); Bezio v. Patenaude,
410 N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (Mass. 1980) (finding that natural parents should be denied custody only
when found unfit to provide for welfare of children); In reMichael B., 604 N.E.2d 122,127 (N.Y.
1992) (recognizing biological parent's right to care and custody of child as superior to that of
others unless parent is proven unfit or has abandoned child); In reKristina L., 520 A.2d 574,582
(RI. 1987) (finding that natural parents' right to raise children in less than perfect manner is
superior to rights of foster parents who may be outstanding nurturers, unless natural parents are
unfit); Psaty v. Psaty, 789 P.2d 96, 101 (Wash. 1990) (holding that to terminate parental rights
of nonconsenting parent, court must find parent unfit); see also Kristin Brandon, Comment, The
Liberty Interests of Foster Parents and the Future of Foster Care, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 403, 412 (1994)
(noting that clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness is necessary to terminate
parental rights).
3. See infra Part l.B.
4. See Carvalho v. Lewis, 274 S.E.2d 471, 472 (Ga. 1981).
5. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
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courts that impose their own prejudices under the guise of exercising
discretion.
Part I of this Article discusses the fundamental right of parents to
the care and companionship of their children. Although this right is
not absolute, parental rights can be terminated only under certain
specified conditions. Part II discusses the conditions under which
children will be removed from their parents, comparing what is
required when lesbian or gay parents are involved with what is
required when no lesbian or gay parents are involved. Although
courts in some states apply the relevant criteria in an evenhanded
manner, regardless of the sexual orientation of the parents, courts in
other states only pretend to operate impartially. Still other courts,
unfortunately, do not even pretend to act equitably, apparently
choosing instead to base their decisions on their own prejudices. Part
III discusses the types of harm to the child that the courts consider
when deciding on parental custody. Part IV concludes that unless the
current system in some states is changed, innocent parents and
children will continue to be harmed and faith in the objectivity and
fairness of the courts will continue to erode.
I. RIGHTS OF THE PARENT
Whenever discussing individual rights, it is important to establish
the nature of the particular right under discussion-whether it is a
mere liberty interest or, instead, a fundamental right. A mere liberty
interest may be regulated or abridged by the state so long as the state
does so in a way that is rationally related to the promotion of a
legitimate state goal.6 A fundamental right, however, cannot be
abridged by the state unless the state can bear "especially high
burdens of justification for the infringement."7 Thus, before an
analysis of the right of lesbians and gays to parent their children can
be offered, the relative importance of that right first must be established.
A. The Fundamental Right to Parent
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to have and raise
children as being fundamental.' Although stated in a variety of ways
6. See Williams v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955) (noting that law does not
need to be logically consistent with its aims in every respect to be constitutional as long as it is
rationally based to correct evil at hand). But see Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't Ask, If It
Is, Don't Tel" On Deference, Rationality
, 
and the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 430-32
(1995) (discussing rational basis test which is less deferential than Lee Optical test).
7. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSrITUTIONAL LAW 446 (12th ed. 1991).
8. See cases cited supra note 1.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:841
and applied in many different situations, the Court's position on the
importance of preserving family integrity is clear. In Meyer v.
Nebraska,9 for example, the Supreme Court described the right of
individuals to have a home and to raise children as essential to the
pursuit of happiness. 0 In Prince v. Massachusetts," the Court made
clear that "the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents."' 2  In Santosky v. Kramer," the Court discussed the
fundamental right of natural parents to the custody, care, and
supervision of their child.'4  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,'5 the plurality made clear that choices involving
family matters are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6 The Court explained in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services'7 that its "decisions have by now made plain beyond the need
for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her
children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.""'18
State courts also have expressed their appreciation of the great
importance of parent-child relationships.19 The Supreme Court of
Utah describes the right of the parent to maintain a relationship with
his or her child as "transcend[ing] all property and economic rights
... [and being] rooted not in state or federal statutory or constitu-
tional law, to which it is logically and chronologically prior, but in
nature and human instinct."2" The Utah court recognized that
parents' rights to raise their own children have been fundamental to
Anglo-American culture and presupposed by our social, political, and
9. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
10. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
11. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
12. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
13. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
14. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (holding that parents have
fundamental liberty interest in care, custody, and management of their child and that interest
cannot be abridged without due process).
15. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
16. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
17. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
18. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
19. See, e.g., Reed v. Norwalk Hosps., No. CV-950146525, 1996 WL 502491, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1996) (discussing importance of parent-child relationship); Pitts v.Johnson Co. Dep't
of Pub. Welfare, 491 N.E.2d 1013, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (considering "fundamental
importance of the parent-child relationship at stake"); Prince v. Prince, No. A-95-205, 1996 WL
331142, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. June 18, 1996) (presuming "critical importance" of parent-child
relationship); In reKovacs, 854 P.2d 629, 633 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (discussing "fundamental
importance of the parent-child relationship to the welfare of the child").
20. In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982).
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legal institutions.2 Other state supreme courts also have recognized
the importance of the right of parents to the custody and companion-
ship of their children.22
If indeed the Utah Supreme Court is correct in suggesting that
family relationships are "as fundamental to the purpose and enjoy-
ment of life as the freedoms of speech and press are to the preserva-
tion of our political order,"2" then states must have compelling
interests at stake if they are to be justified in terminating an
individual's parental rights. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his
dissent in Lassiter, "there can be few losses more grievous than the
abrogation of parental rights."24 The interest that a parent has in
maintaining a relationship with her childJustice Blackmun explained,
"occupies a unique place in our legal culture given the centrality of
family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility.""
The parent's right to custody and companionship, however, is
not absolute.26 Parental rights may be forfeited if the parent is
21. Seeid.
22. See, e.g., In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 333 (Ill. 1995) (recognizing that natural
parent's interest in care, custody and control of his or her child long has been recognized and
is constitutionally protected); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121, 1127 (Kan. 1981) ("It is
clear under our decisions and those of the United States Supreme Court that a natural parent's
right to the custody of his or her children is a fundamental right which may not be disturbed
... absent a showing that the natural parent is unfit."); In re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122, 128
(N.Y. 1992) (finding that foster parents have no right to seek permanent custody unless parental
rights have been terminated); In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574,579 (R.I. 1987) ("Absent a finding
of unfitness, the natural parents' right to bear and raise their child in a less than perfect way
remains superior to the rights of foster parents who may be exemplary nurturers.").
23. 648 P.2d at 1376.
24. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 40 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); see also Paul v. Steele, 461 N.E.2d 983,
987 (I1. 1984) (noting that judgment of parental unfitness is "one of the most devastating of
judicial decisions").
25. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 38 (BIackmun,J., dissenting).
26. See Ysla v. Lopez, 684 A.2d 775, 782 n.8 (D.C. 1996) ("[T]he parent's right is not
absolute, even in the absence of a finding of unfitness, and it is subordinate to the best interest
of the child."); Collins v. Gaibreath, 403 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. App. 1980) ("Although the legal
right of a parent to custody of a child is superior to the legal right ofall others, this right is not
absolute."); State v. Siemer, 454 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Iowa 1990) ("A parent's right to custody and
control of a child is not absolute."); Stremski v. Owens, 734 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Kan. 1987) ("A
parent has a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in the
custody and control of his or her child, but this does not translate to an absolute right
custody."); Lee v. Lee, 595 A.2d 408, 412 (Me. 1991) ("The right of a parent to the physical
custody of the child.., is not absolute."); In re C.G. 747 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Mon. 1988) ("The
right to maintain the family unit is not absolute."); Foster v. BJ.C., 277 N.W.2d 281, 284 (N.D.
1979) ("The right of a parent to the custody of his child is not absolute and under extraordinary
circumstances, custody of a child may be awarded to a non-parent over the objections of a
parent."); Reynolds v. GolI, 661 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ohio 1996) ("The right of custody by the
biological parents is not absolute and can be forfeited."); In reJ.M.j., 379 N.W. 2d 816,819 (S.D.
1986) ("Although parents have a fundamental right to their children, it is not an absolute and
unconditional right.") (citation omitted); In the Interest ofJ.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex.
1994) ("The rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is paramount.");
In reSumey, 621 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) ("The parent's constitutional rights...
do not afford an absolute protection against state interference with the family relationship.").
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unfit27 or is unable to care for the child.28 Sometimes, other
"compelling circumstances" willjustify severing the tie between parent
and child,29 such as if the child and parent have been separated for
a very long period of time." At the very least, for custody to be
awarded to a third party over a parent, it must be shown that
continued custody with the parent actually would be detrimental to
the child."
When analyzing the standard for awarding custody to a third party
over a parent, it is important to note who qualifies as a third party.
Such a third party may be a stranger to the child, someone who
knows the child, or a relative of the child. 2 Generally, anyone who
is not a biological or adoptive parent of the child will be considered
a third party unless that individual is a de facto parente' or has in
loco parentis standing.'
It is extremely difficult for a nonparent to wrest custody away from
a parent. Because the nonparent "bears a heavy burden of persua-
27. See supra note 2.
28. SeeSporlederv. Hermes, 471 N.W.2d 202,205 (Wis. 1991) (concluding that non-parent
may bring action to obtain custody only if parent is unfit, unable to care for child, or other
compelling reasons exist).
29. See Carvalho v. Lewis, 274 S.E.2d 471, 472 (Ga. 1981) (holding that "a finding of
unfitness must center on the parent alone," and not merely on whether child may gain
advantages elsewhere).
30. SeeJuvenile Appeal v. Commissioner of Children & Youth Servs., 420 A.2d 875, 884-85
(Conn. 1979) (finding that length of time child and mother were separated justified not
returning child to mother); In re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122, 130 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that
prolonged separation from parent may be considered as factor allowing court to determine what
situation would be best for child).
31. SeeVlasta Z. v. San Bernadino County Welfare Dep't, 523 P.2d 244,246 (Cal. 1974) (en
banc) (holding that to award custody to non-parent, express finding that parental custody would
be detrimental to child supported by evidence that parental custody would actually harm child
must be made); In re Higby, 611 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (determining that fit
parent may be denied custody when award of custody would be detrimental to the child);
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Va. App. 1994) (holding that non-parent will be
granted custody over parent if continued custody with parent is detrimental to child), rev'd, 457
S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995); In re Allen, 626 P.2d 16, 22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (reasoning that
parental rights might be outweighed if placement with parent would detrimentally affect child's
growth and development).
32. See Bowie v. Arder, 490 N.W.2d 568, 578 (Mich. 1992) (holding that relatives of child
do not have greater right to custody than other persons because of their close biological
relationship); In re Townsend, 427 N.E.2d 1231 (Ill. 1981) (half-sister treated like other third
parties); see also Commmonwealth ev reL Zaffarno v. Genaro, 455 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 1983)
(grandparent treated like other third parties).
33. SeeZackv. Fiebert, 563 A.2d 58, 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (stating that if third
parties can show they stand in shoes of parent, status of parent should be accorded them for
purposes of determining standard to apply for custody).
34. See Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky. 1979) (holding that visitation should
be granted to person standing in loco parentis in custody proceeding when it is in child's best
interest to do so); State ex reL Williams v. Juvenile Court, 204 N.W. 21, 22 (Minn. 1925)
(determining that stepmother placed herself in loco parentis to child).
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sion,"35 it may not even suffice to establish that the parent intention-
ally abused or neglected the child.36 Thus, grandparents, who have
no greater claim to custody than other third parties,3 7 usually will be
unable to establish that they, rather than either of the parents, should
have custody. 8 To bring about a change in custody, third parties
must do more than establish that they would provide a more loving
and nurturing environment for a child than would the child's
parents.3 9 Nor will third parties be awarded custody merely because
the child might gain financial, educational, or moral advantages with
them. ° Because of what one court described as the "sacredness of
parental rights,"41 third parties must prove parental unfitness or
other very unusual conditions to wrest custody from the parents.42
B. Parental Rights Termination
The New York Court of Appeals spelled out what some of those
unusual conditions might be, explaining that a state may terminate
parental rights "if there is first a judicial finding of surrender,
abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect, unfortunate or involun-
tary extended disruption of custody, or other equivalent but rare
extraordinary circumstance which would drastically affect the welfare
of the child."'43 It is precisely because very important rights are at
risk that courts establish a high threshold before severing parent-child
35. Gerald D. v. Peggy R., Nos. C-9104, 79-12-143-CV, 1980 WL 20452, at *8 (Del. Fam. Ct.
Nov. 17, 1980); see also Burke v. Poope, 531 A.2d 782, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (discussing
"heavy burden of persuasion" that must be met if parent is to lose her right to custody to non-
parent).
36. See In reJj.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Minn. 1986) (concluding that termination of
parental rights is appropriate when neglect will continue for long or indefinite period).
37. Grandparents maybe given special visitation rights by statute. SeeRuppelv. Lesner, 364
N.W.2d 665,668 (Mich. 1984) (discussing right of grandparents to bring action seeking visitation
rights in limited circumstances pursuant to Michigan's Child Custody Act). But see Brooks v.
Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995) (striking statute giving grandparents special visitation
rights); Painter v. Bannister, 285 Iowa 1390 (1966) (awarding custody to maternal grandparents
over natural father on basis of doctor's testimony that grandparents were psychological parents).
38. See RuppeA 364 N.W.2d at 668 (noting that grandparents, relatives, and other persons
have equal claims to custody).
39. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 280 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), reu'd, 457 S.E.2d 102
(Va. 1995).
40. See Carvalho v. Lewis, 274 S.E.2d 471, 472 (Ga. 1981); see also DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114
S. Ct. 1, 2 (1993) (holding that unrelated persons are not authorized under Iowa, Michigan, or
federal law to retain custody of child simply because they may be better able to provide for
child's future, unless natural parents have been found unfit).
41. Champagne v. Welfare Div., 691 P.2d 849, 854 (Nev. 1984).
42. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 280; see also In re Christina H., 618 A.2d 228, 229 (Me. 1992)
(recognizing clear and convincing standard as appropriate test for terminating parental rights).
43. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283 (N.Y. 1976); see also In reKirchner, 649 N.E.2d
324, 328 (IlL 1995) (stating that parental rights may be terminated if there is finding of abuse,
abandonment, neglect, or unfitness).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:841
ties. Because courts want to avoid the devastating effects resulting
from the termination of these rights, the evidence of parental
unfitness sufficient to separate a child from his parents permanently
must be clear and convincing."4
The Nevada Supreme Court cautioned that courts must be
exceedingly careful in finding that a parent is unsuitable due to fault
or incapacitation.' Courts accordingly may require a showing of
very harmful activity before they will conclude that the parent is unfit.
In In re PL.C. & D.L.C.,46 for example, a Minnesota court refused
to find a father unfit despite evidence that the father had physically
abused his wife and children and was involved in an adulterous
relationship. 47  In Alsager v. District Court,48 a court considered the
fitness of parents who "sometimes permitted their children to leave
the house in cold weather without winter clothing on, 'allowed them'
to play in traffic, to annoy neighbors, to eat mush for supper, to live
in a house containing dirty dishes and laundry, and to sometimes
arrive late at school."49 The Alsager court concluded that these
parents were not unfit.5"
C. Parental Autonomy
Parental rights are afforded such great protection for several
reasons. First, because courts presume that parents have the best
interests of their children at heart, the state is willing to give parents
substantial authority over their children." Second, courts have
recognized the right of parents to raise their children in an environ-
44. See In reSyck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 183 (Ill. 1990) (finding termination of parental rights to
be devastating because parent whose rights are terminated will not have visitation rights, so
evidence of unfitness must be established by clear and convincing standard); In re Christina H.,
618 A.2d 228, 229 (Me. 1992) (stating that clear and convincing evidence is necessary to support
decision to terminate parental rights); Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 280 (holding that child's right to
care and support of parent and parent's right to custody and companionship should be severed
only by compelling reasons established by clear and convincing evidence).
45. See Champagne, 691 P.2d at 857; see also Alsager v. District Courty, 406 F. Supp. 10, 24
(S.D. Iowa 1975) ("Termination is a drastic, final step which ... can be fraught with danger.
Accordingly, to preserve the best interests of both parents and children ... terminations must
only occur where more harm is likely to befall the child by staying with his parents than by being
permanently separated from them.").
46. 384 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
47. In re P.LC. & D.L.C., 384 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
48. 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
49. Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 22 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
50. Id. at 22 (holding that home situation did notjustify termination of parental rights even
if allegations involving lack of care and supervision were assumed to be true).
51. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (asserting that tradition of parental
authority is consistent with tradition of individual authority).
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ment without government interference.52 Furthermore, some courts,
like Alsager, believe that unless parents are given a wide zone of
latitude, there will be a chilling effect on what parents will do with
and for their children." Precisely because courts do not want to
inhibit parents in exercising their fundamental right to family
integrity, courts tend to give much deference to parents to decide
how their children should be raised.54
The state entrusts parents with the responsibility to guide and
inspire their children by precept and example.55  Not only are
parents better able to respond to the particularized needs of their
children, but parents will be able to provide a bulwark against the
standardization and homogenization of children.56 As the Supreme
Court of Utah has observed, family autonomy helps to assure the
diversity that is characteristic of a free society like ours. 7 Indeed,
the court explained that allowing parents much latitude in rearing
their children is one of the best ways of preserving pluralism because
much "of the rich variety in American culture has been transmitted
from generation to generation by determined parents who were
acting against the best interest of their children, as defined by official
dogma." 8 The court found that a state threatens diversity when it
terminates the rights of parents merely because they do not share
52. See In re Kersey, 124 So. 2d 726, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ("Particularly should it
be true ... that individuals may confidently look to the courts to fulfill their historic role of
guardians of the rights and liberties of the people, one of which is to rear... their children,
without the threat of unreasonable interference of governmental authority."); In re H.H., 528
N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) ("The state's interest in protecting children must be
balanced against the parents' countervailing interest in being able to raise their children in an
environment free from government interference." (citing Alsager, 406 F. Supp. at 22)); Frame
v. Nehls, 550 N.W.2d 739, 747 (Mich. 1996) (discussing "parents' fundamental right to raise a
child without interference from the government").
53. See In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1376 (Utah 1982) ("To allow a court to decide who can best
provide a child with intellectual stimulation could chill the propagation and perpetuation of
disfavored political, philosophical, and religious views within the privacy of the family circle.");
cf. Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 313 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing "parental right to
structure the education and religious beliefs of one's children"); Alabama & Coushatta Tribes
v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1334 (E.D. Tex. 1993) ("[T]he
right of parents to participate and direct their children's education and religious upbringing is
firmly established in constitutional doctrine." (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 405 U.S. 205 (1972);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925))); Lewis v. Spaulding, 85 N.Y.S.2d 682, 690 (Sup.
Ct. 1948) ("Fundamental is the right of the parent to rear his child in a particular religious
faith, or to rear him as a non-believer if he so elects.").
54. See id.
55. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (recognizing state's deference to parental control over
children).
56. See Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that society is
not well-equipped to be sensitive to changing needs and drives of children in order to provide
them with necessary support and guidance).
57. See 648 P.2d at 1376.
58. id.
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officially approved values.59 Thus, the Utah Supreme Court suggest-
ed that even parents who "contradict officially approved values" may
in fact benefit society.' The court made clear that the protection
of parental rights promotes values that are essential to the preserva-
tion of human freedom and dignity.6' Indeed, the court bestowed
on the family a rather exalted status by deeming the family essential
for the conservation and transmission of cherished values and
traditions.62
II. PARENTAL UNFITNESS AND THE NEEDS OF THE CHILD
Despite a strong presumption that parents have a right to care for
their children and to instill within them those values that the parents
believe appropriate, the state has the power to protect children and
act for their welfare by terminating a harmful parent-child relation-
ship.63 Children will not be forced to endure great and unnecessary
risks and hardships at the hands of anyone, including their parents."4
Because a parental rights termination is such a drastic step, however,




Unfitness is not to be measured in degrees-either the parent is fit
or unfit.6 6 Moreover, isolated instances of less-than-adequate care
will not establish a parent's unfitness nor justify termination of
parental rights.67 Rather, to "provide a jurisdictional basis for
termination, neglect must be serious and persistent and be sufficiently
harmful to the child so as to mandate a forfeiture of parental
rights."' The question when determining fitness is not whether one
party would be a better parent, but whether continued custody by the
parent actually would be harmful to the child.69 Were courts to
59. See id.
60. Id
61. See id. at 1375-76.
62. See id& at 1376.
63. SeeBottomsv. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102,108 (Va. 1995) (discussingfinding by trial court
that parental presumption has been rebutted).
64. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (determining that state has wide
latitude to limit parental freedom to affect child's welfare adversely).
65. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 280 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), reud 457 S.E.2d 102
(Va. 1995); In re Christina H., 618 A.2d 228, 229 (Me. 1992).
66. See In re Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992).
67. See Champagne v. Welfare Div., 691 P.2d 849, 855 (Nev. 1984).
68. Itt
69. See id. (noting circumstances under which parent may be found"unsuitable" to maintain
parental status).
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terminate parental rights merely because other parents would be
more loving, supportive, or understanding or because other parents
could provide better educational or financial opportunities for the
children,70 parental rights terminations might be quite frequent.
As the Illinois Supreme Court pointed out in In re Syck,71 when
courts are determining parental unfitness, they must do so without
considering whether awarding custody to someone else would better
promote the child's best interests. 72 The best interests of the child
will be considered only after a finding of parental unfitness has been
made.73 Indeed, courts or statutes that declare a parent unfit solely
because the child's best interests would be promoted better by
placement elsewhere may violate the parent's constitutional rights.'
Unfitness analysis is complicated because a parent can be unfit in
a variety of ways. Among other things, courts will consider whether
the parent can provide for the physical needs of the child.75 For
example, in considering the child's physical needs, courts may
investigate whether the child is well-fed and well-clothed,76 in a clean
home,77 and free from physical abuse.7' Further, a parent may be
70. See Carvalho v. Lewis, 274 S.E.2d 471,472 (Ga. 1981) (determining that parental rights
will not be terminated merely because other parents could provide better financial or
educational opportunities); see alsoDeBoer v. Schmidt, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993) (holding that
unrelated persons cannot retain custody merely because they are better able to provide for
future and education); cf Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 280 ("All too frequently, foster parents or third
parties would be more willing and better able to provide a loving and nurturing environment
for a child than would the child's parents."), reu'd, 457 S.E. 2d 102 (Va. 1995).
71. 562 N.E.2d 174 (I1. 1990).
72. See In re Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 183 (I1. 1990); see also In reJ.C.P., 307 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1983) (maintaining that finding of unfitness must be based on parent alone).
73. See In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 189 (11. 1994) (Heiple, J., in support of denial of
rehearing) (stating that rights of child's natural parents must be terminated before child is
available for adoption); In re D., 293 A.2d 171, 175 (NJ. 1972) (stating that parental rights must
be terminated prior to determining child's best interest).
74. See In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374 (Utah 1982) (holding that parents' constitutionally
protected rights are violated when terminated solely on basis of child's best interest).
75. See Gerald D. v. Peggy R., Nos. C-9104, 79-12-143-CV, 1980 WL 20452, at *8 (Del. Fain.
Ct. Nov. 17, 1980) (determining that mother can provide for physical needs of her child); State
v. D.B., 740 P.2d 11, 15-16 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (terminating parental rights, at least in part,
because of parent's inability to meet physical needs of child consistently); see also Spurlock v.
Texas Dep't of Protective Servs., 904 S.W.2d 152, 158 (Tex. App. 1996) (terminating parental
rights in part because parent could not meet physical needs of children).
76. SeeWhite v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (Miss. 1990) (looking at evidence of
whether child was clothed or fed adequately in determining whether parent is unfit).
77. See, e.g.,J.F.Rv. R.R, 482 S.W.2d 543,545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (listing clean and orderly
home as evidence of maternal care); In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 576 (R.I. 1987) (noting as
evidence of poor parenting that mother's "house was cluttered, with dirty dishes in the sink and
a pile of dirty laundry in the living room"); Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89, 90 (Va. 1977)
(detailing testimony regarding mother's inability to keep house clean).
78. See In re Burrell, 388 N.E.2d 738, 738 (Ohio 1979) (listing factors in determining well-
being of child, such as whether evidence of abuse or neglect exists, child's performance at
school, and whether child is properly dressed and behaved).
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held responsible for failing to protect the child from others.79
In considering the child's emotional needs, courts may examine the
rapport between parent and child,"° and, depending upon the age
of the child, the child's preferences regarding who will have custo-
dy,"1 although those preferences will not be followed if they would
be contrary to the child's best interests. 2 At the very least, the court
will examine whether the child is happy and well-adjusted." If the
child is thriving,84 courts will tend not to modify custody,85 as the
relevant criteria are whether the child is well behaved and who would
best care for the child. 6 Regrettably, even if a child is "well behaved
and cared for," the child may be removed from a parent who is gay
or lesbian. 87
When courts consider the moral needs of the child, they may have
any of a number of concerns in mind. Some courts have held that
the repeated exposure of a child to an illicit relationship makes the
79. See In reAngelia P., 623 P.2d 198, 207 (Cal. 1981) ("Child abuse includes more than a
parent's physical abuse... the term may involve a failure to protect the child from harm caused
by others.").
80. See, e.g., Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132, 134 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (citing Delta
County Family and Children's Services' conclusions regarding nature of relationship between
children and their mother); In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d at 574 (discussing child's attachment to
her foster parents and lack of such relationship with her natural parents); Bottoms v. Bottoms,
444 S.E.2d 276, 279 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that mother and child have had close, loving
mother-child relationship), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
81. SeeBuness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 989 (Alaska 1989) (deciding that child's emotional
response to learning about his removal from custody by non-parent was indicative of strong
bond that had developed between them).
82. See S.E.G. v. RAG., 735 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Mo. CL App. 1987) ("Minor children's
preference will be followed only if that preference is consistent with the best interests and
welfare of the child.") (citing L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
83. See, e.g., Brandt v. Brandt, 425 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (reviewing facts
pertaining to children's general health and ability to function in school and at home); Sartoph
v. Sartoph, 354 A.2d 467, 472 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1976) (concluding that child "was happy,
healthy, well-adjusted and emotionally stable"); In re Larry & Scott H., 192 N.E.2d 683, 684
(Ohio 1963) (describing children as being healthy, happy, and out-going).
84. SeeS. v.J., 367 N.Y.S.2d 405,409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (finding facts that "the child has
thrived under her care and guidance, is doing very well at school academically and socially [and]
has fully adjusted to his surroundings" persuasive).
85. See Cupples v. Cupples, 531 N.W.2d 656, 657 (Iowa CL App. 1995) (stating that in
custody cases, court tries to determine where child is "most likely to thrive") (citing In reEngler,
503 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Iowa CL App. 1993)).
86. See S. v.J., 367 N.Y.S.2d at 410. But see Marie Weston Evans, Note, Parwt and Child:
MJ.P. v.J.G.P.: An Analysis of the Relevance of Parental Homosexuality in Child Custody Determinations,
35 OKiA. L. REv. 633, 635 (1982) (analyzing case in which court removed child from mother
although evidence "indicated that the child was happy, intelligent, and normal ... and would
suffer trauma if he were to be separated from her").
87. See MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 967-68 (Okla. 1982) (regarding lesbian mother who
lost custody despite child's being happy and healthy); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-I, 1988 WL
30173, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (explaining that lesbian mother loses custody
although she "has done a goodjob in raising her [daughter] to be a normal, well-adjusted child,
and there has been no proof that the Mother's lifestyle has adversely affected the child's growth
or development").
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parent per se unfit.' Other courts fear that a parent who acts
immorally may set an example that the child later will attempt to
emulate.89 Still others are concerned that the child will not under-
stand the moral views of society90 or, perhaps, that some other kind
of unspecified harm will occur.91
When courts presume that exposure to an illicit relationship will
cause harm without specifying what that harm will be, it will be
difficult, if not impossible, to overcome that presumption. Further,
the very vagueness of the standard invites different judges to apply it
differently, even in relevantly similar factual situations. Partially
because of the potential unfairness and inconsistency that likely will
occur if a vague standard of harm is used, courts tend to require that
the harm be described with some specificity, and further, that there
be a showing of actual or likely harm, before they will find a parent
morally unfit to raise children.92 Nonetheless, the moral needs of
the child, even without further elaboration, have been used to justify
a number of restrictions on custody and visitation, especially when gay
or lesbian parents are involved.
B. Moral Needs
The Virginia Supreme Court has pointed out that in custody
decisions, the "moral climate in which the child is to be raised"" is
an "important consideration."94 States have good reason to pause,
however, before making decisions based on their own version of the
"proper" moral climate. As the Supreme Court of Utah has suggest-
ed, parents may enrich their children's lives even when contradicting
"officially approved values." 95  Further, as the Supreme Court
explained in Bellotti v. Baird,96 the state's affirmative sponsorship of
88. SeeRoe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (finding that child's continuous exposure
to his father's same-sex relationship rendered father unfit as a matter of law).
89. SeeJarrett v.Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424 (Ill. 1979) (finding that mother's "disregard
for existing standards of conduct instructs her children, by example, that they, too, may ignore
them, and could well encourage the children to engage in similar activity in the future")
(citations omitted); Brandt v. Brandt, 425 N.E.2d 1251, 1263 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding
that mother's "disregard for existing [social] standards" of conduct by living with married man,
could influence children to engage in similar activity).
90. See M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 969 (recounting expert testimony regarding important role
parent play in teaching children societal values).
91. Cf Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (presuming that
parents' illicit sexual conduct will result in harming their child).
92. See infra notes 286-308 and accompanying text (discussing moral harm).
93. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107 (Va. 1995) (citing Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d
89, 91 (Va. 1977)).
94. Brown, 237 S.E.2d at 91.
95. In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1376 (Utah 1983).
96. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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particular ethical, religious, or political beliefs is something the state
should not attempt in a "society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice."97
Even were there no impropriety in the state's affirmatively sponsor-
ing particular ethical beliefs about which there is a consensus, there
still would be difficulties in the state's affirmatively sponsoring ethical
beliefs about which no consensus exists. A variety of issues are
debated hotly precisely because there is no consensus about their
moral permissibility. For example, the morality of abortion is
something about which reasonable people disagree. Similarly, the
moral permissibility of same-sex relations is a controversial issue."
Unless states are careful, they will assume a moral consensus about
particular practices that do not in fact exist. 01
Historically, courts were less concerned about whether there was a
societal moral consensus 2 and were more willing to say, for exam-
ple, that individuals who committed adultery were morally unfit to
raise children as a matter of law. 3 Today, however, courts no
longer view adultery as establishing the per se unfitness of the
parent,' although the existence of an ongoing adulterous relation-
97. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979).
98. SeeJuliet A. Cox, Comment, Judicial Enforcament of Moral Imperatives: Is the Best Interest
of the Child Being Sacrficed to Maintain Societal Homogeneity?, 59 MO. L. REV. 775, 794 (1994)
("Because of the diversity of views attached to the moral implications of homosexual behavior,
courts should abstain from basingjudgments on such reasoning and defer to the parents' views
of right and wrong in raising their children.").
99. SeePlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,850 (1992) (plurality
opinion) ("Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall
disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even
in its earliest stages.").
100. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Reasonable people may disagree about whether particular sexual acts are moral or immoral.").
101. SeeWhaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting "immoral
conduct" test as unworkable "in light of the diversity of religious and moral practice in this
country"); see also Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1215
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing widespread disagreement on whether homosexual activity
is different in nature than sexual orientation "as a matter of scientific fact and as a matter of
moral, religious, and legal opinion").
102. The lack of a consensus does not imply a moral relativist position, although it may imply
that government should not choose between two contradictory positions, each of which claims
to represent a moral certainty. See Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?,
70 IND. LJ. 331, 371 (1995) ("[Ihe principle of radical skepticism must be imposed on the
government to protect the individual citizen's right to act with moral certainty.").
103. See Wolpa v. Wolpa, 153 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Neb. 1967) (stating that adulterous act
renders one unfit, as matter of law, to be parent); see also Davis v. Davis, 372 A.2d 231,235 (Md.
1977) (noting that strong presumption of parental unfitness arises if person has engaged in
adultery).
104. See Hansen v. Hansen, 169 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Minn. 1969); Feldman v. Feldman, 358
N.Y.S.2d 507,511 (App. Div. 1974) ("The law is well established that even adulterous acts do not
ipso facto present a sufficient basis for denying continued custody .... .") (citations omitted).
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ship may enter into a court's parental fitness calculation.1°5 Numer-
ous courts, however, have suggested that past adultery alone will not
establish unfitness."' Courts reason that if the immoral relationship
is over, it no longer poses a threat to the children and thus does not
justify preventing that parent from having custody. °  Because
custody decisions should not be used by the states to punish wayward
parents,0 8 past indiscretions may be ignored as long as the children
are not adversely affected by them."
Courts seem unconcerned about why the adulterous relationship
ended. If the individuals no longer are seeing each other and there
is little likelihood that the relationship will be renewed, the court
probably will decide that the past adulterous relationship does not
pose a threat to the children, and thus does notjustify preventing the
parent from having custody."0 If the individuals marry each other
once they are legally free to do so, the adulterous relationship ceases
to exist and is supplanted by a legal relation. In this situation, the
court probably will suggest that the past adulterous relationship does
not bar the parent from having custody."' Thus, whether the
adulterous relationship has ended because the relationship no longer
exists (and no other adulterous relationship has taken its place) or
because the illicit aspect of the relationship no longer exists (because
the individuals are now legally married), the court likely will no
longer view the adultery as establishing parental unfitness or as
justifying the denial of custody 1 2
105. See Petit v. Holifield, 443 So. 2d 874, 878 (Miss. 1984) (suggesting that continued
promiscuity would contribute to court's finding of parental unfitness).
106. See Oliver v. Oliver, 140 A.2d 908, 911 (Md. 1958) ("The cessation of the adulterous
affair is an important [mitigating] factor."); Sartoph v. Sartoph, 354 A.2d 467, 471 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1976) ("The presumption of unfitness is overcome by a showing that the adulterous
party has repented, has terminated the adulterous relationship, and has changed his or her
errant ways so that there is little likelihood of a recurrence of past indiscreet behavior.")
(footnote omitted); PetiL 443 So. 2d at 878 ("The mere fact that a natural parent has had a prior
adulterous relationship is insufficient to warrant a finding that the parent is unfit.");J.F.R. v.
IR., 482 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) ("But past moral lapses do not in themselves
make a parent unfit, and are to be measured by the effect, if any, they have on the children's
welfare.").
107. See Sartoph, 354 A.2d at 472 (reversing lower court and holding that mother's
termination of illicit relationship was sufficient to grant her custody of child in light of fact that,
in all other respects, mother was fit parent).
108. See Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that purpose
of custody decision is not to punish parent).
109. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
110. See Sartoph, 354 A.2d at 472.
111. See Petit, 443 So. 2d at 878 (suggesting that marriage and cessation of promiscuity will
permit continuance of parental rights).
112. Cf. Ward v. Virginia Depute of Soc. Serv., 408 S.E.2d 921,923 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). To
terminate parental rights, the state must show inter alia that "it is not reasonably likely that the
conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated
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Even an ongoing adulterous relationship will not result necessarily
in the parent being declared unfit.' Courts now tend to view "the
issue of guilt in causing a divorce and the issue of fitness for the
custody of minor children [as] separate and distinct."'14  Even a
parent whose conduct provides grounds for divorce may not necessari-
ly be deemed unfit and stripped of his or her custodial rights."-
The primary concern of the court will be to determine whether the
parent's relationship does, in fact, impact negatively on the child. 6
Absent clear adverse effects on the child, the parent will not be
denied custody based solely on the adultery."7
1. Fornication
Individuals who have a sexual relationship and are not married
either to each other or to third parties are committing the act of
"fornication" rather than adultery"' Historically, individuals
committing fornication also were viewed as morally unfit to raise
children."9 Today, fornication, like adultery, will not, in itself, be
a bar to custody, as long as the children are not adversely affected by
the relationship. 20
The distinction between adultery and fornication is an important
one. 121  Society today generally views sex between two unmarried
so as to allow the child's safe return to his parent or parents within a reasonable time." Id.
Once the adulterous relationship has ended, the offending condition presumably will have been
corrected or eliminated.
113. See Sutherland v. Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d 617, 618 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding
decision to allow ex-wife to retain custody despite "live-in, adulterous relationship"); Bickler v.
Bickler, 344 S.E.2d 630, 632 (W. Va. 1986) (noting that continuation of adulterous conduct was
not so grossly immoral as to justify denial of custody).
114. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 475 P.2d 268, 269 (Ariz. 1970).
115. See id; Wendland v. Wendand, 138 N.W.2d 185, 189-90 (Wis. 1965) ("[I]mnmoral
conduct persedoes not make a wife 'unfit' to have the custody of her children. Where a woman
has been a bad wife she nevertheless may be a good mother.").
116. See Anonymous, 475 P.2d at 270 (affirming mother's custody of child because illicit
relationship did not affect child adversely).
117. See id.; see also D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that
parent's conduct must affect child's welfare adversely to deprive parent of custody).
118. See BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 653 (6th ed. 1990) (defining fornication as "[s]exual
intercourse other than between married persons"); id. at 51 (defining adultery as "[v]oluntary
sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's husband or wife,
or by a person with a person who is married to another").
119. SeeJarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424 (Ill. 1980) (depriving woman of custody,
concluding that open and continuous fornication renders mother morally unfit and
endanger[s] the children's moral development").
120. See discussion infra Parts II.C, III (explaining how courts use nexus test and consider
variety of harms to child before terminating relationship).
121. See Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1475 n.16 (D. Utah 1995) (noting
that fornication and adultery are not of same nature nor do they have same social consequenc-
es).
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people as less objectionable than adultery."' Although some
believe that all sexual relationships outside the bonds of matrimony
are immoral,"t others believe that it is morally permissible to live
with someone without benefit of marriage so long as no promises to
an unknowing spouse are being broken.2 4
2. Same-sex relationships
Same-sex relationships are more analogous to opposite-sex
relationships without benefit of marriage than to adulterous relation-
ships, assuming that neither member of the same-sex couple is
married to someone else.125 Of course, same-sex couples and
unmarried, opposite-sex couples are different in an important respect.
In most cases, unmarried, opposite-sex individuals who cohabit may
marry, whereas same-sex cohabitants do not have that option.'
26
Insofar as unmarried cohabitants are subject to criticism for failing to
avail themselves of the option to marry, same-sex couples are not
criticized appropriately. Individuals should not have their failure to
marry held against them when the law does not afford them that
option.
27
Presumably, one of the reasons that courts may be reluctant to
award custody to a parent living with a partner to whom he or she is
122. See S. v. J., 367 N.Y.S.2d 405, 409-10 (App. Div. 1975) (distinguishing between case
involving divorced parent and cases in which parties are not formally separated or divorced).
123. See Hann v. Housing Auth. of Easton, 1990 WL 102804, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1990)
(stating that Housing Authority of Easton denied family benefits because mother and father
never had married and thus were living in sin).
124. See, Editorial, Why Same-Sex Marriages Should Be Banned, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 6,1996,
at 4C.
125. Accord Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (equating same-sex
cohabitation with "cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex without benefit of
marriage"), rev'd, 910 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Utah 1996). But see Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d
1, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (refusing to treat same-sex and opposite-sex unmarried relationships
equally).
126. See In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 406 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that opposite-sex partners have
option to marry whereas same-sex partners do not); see also HaraJacobs, A New Approach for Gay
and Lesbian Domestic Partners: Legal Acceptance Through Relational Property Theory, 1 DUKE J.
GENDER, L. & POL'Y 159, 159 (1994) (discussing how gay and lesbian relationships are not legally
recognized and thus fall outside scope of marital dissolution statutes); Barry H. Parsons, Note,
Bottoms v. Bottoms: Erasing the Presumption Favoring a Natural Parent over Third Parties-What
Makes This Mother Unfit, 2 GEO. MASON INDEPENDENT L. REv. 457,487 (1994) ("Unlike hetero-
sexual couples who can get married and thereby end the 'adulterous relationship', gay
relationships can not yet be recognized by legal marriage.").
127. If Hawaii comes to recognize same-sex marriages, then this argument will lose some
force, depending, among other things, on whether the domiciliary state would recognize a same-
sex marriage validly celebrated in Hawaii. For a discussion of Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993), in which the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the state of Hawaii must present
compelling reasons to justify its refusal to recognize same-sex marriages, see Mark Strasser,
Domestic RelationsJurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal
Protection, and Fundamental Interests 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 921 (1995).
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not married is the belief that children need a stable home and that
people living together without a long-term commitment would be less
likely to provide such a home.128 For present purposes, it is unim-
portant to establish whether people who can marry but choose not to
do so can provide sufficiently stable homes (although there is no
reason to doubt that they can). What is important to note is that a
parent who manifests an intention to have a committed, long-term
relationship with a same-sex partner is, all else equal, ess likely to be
awarded custody in certain states." Indeed, courts seem especially
offended when same-sex individuals manifest their commitment to
each other."3 This attitude is rather surprising, given the impor-
tance of a stable parental relationship for children and given that
states are beginning to recognize both members of same-sex couples
as legal parents of the same child or children in certain circum-
stances.
1 31
It may be that courts simply do not believe that same-sex couples
can have long, stable, monogamous, committed relationships. 2 In
Bottoms, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court seemed to
disbelieve that the mother had a "lifetime commitment" to her
partner.1 33 The court noted that the mother's partner supported
the family,"M but then worried about the mother's job skills,"35 as
if the court could not accept that the two partners were committed to
each other.
The refusal to consider seriously the ability of same-sex couples to
have stable, committed relationships may explain partially the Court's
128. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §
19.4 at 806 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing need for courts to consider stability and continuity of
parent/child relationship when awarding custody).
129. See, e.g.,Jacobson v.Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981) (expressing concern that
mother would be living with her same-sex partner); M.J.P. v.J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969-70 (Okla.
1982) (affirming custody transfer to father as result of mother's moving in with same-sex lover).
130. See S v. S, 608 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), (discussing "mock" wedding
ceremony); M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 967 (denying custody to mother who "invite[d] forty friends to
a 'Gay-la Wedding' in a church, performed by a minister"). But seeVan Driel v. Van Driel, 525
N.W.2d 37, 38 (S.D. 1994) (permitting mother to retain custody of children despite having
-'exchanged vows' with her lesbian partner with the intent to enter into a permanent and
monogamous relationship").
131. See, e.g., In reTammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (allowing unmarried same-sex
cohabitants to adopt child); Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 397-98 (construing purpose of New York
adoption statute as ensuring best possible home for child irrespective of adoptive parent's sexual
orientation); In re B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993) (approving adoption by
unmarried same-sex couple).
132. See RiCHARD MOHR, GAYS AND JUSTICE 25 (1988) (discussing "the stereotype of gays as
sex-crazed maniacs").
133. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 106 (Va. 1995).
134. See id. at 108.
135. See id. (discussing guardian's view that mother's future in job market was "bleak").
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decision in Bowers v. Hardwick... In Bowers, the Court refused to
declare that the right to privacy encompasses homosexual sodomy
between consenting adults. 7 The Court implied that if it did,
there would be no non-arbitrary way to exclude adultery from the
right to privacy." Yet, such a claim is specious. In the
paradigmatic case of adultery, one of the parties breaks his or her
agreement to be faithful unbeknownst to the other party; whereas, in
situations involving consenting same-sex adults, no agreements are
broken and no one is harmed. Further, same-sex relations between
committed partners may help promote a stable, durable bond just as
opposite-sex relations do for opposite-sex couples.x 9 The same
cannot be said of most adulterous relations. In Bowers, the Supreme
Court's failure to appreciate that same-sex individuals can have
committed, long-term relationships may have undermined its ability
to understand why sodomitic relations are protected by the right to
privacy even if adulterous relations are not. Perhaps if the Court had
understood that lesbians and gays can have committed, long-term
relationships, it would not have denied so cavalierly the "connection
between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other.""4  If the Court is unable to
distinguish between same-sex and adulterous relations within the
context of the right to privacy, notwithstanding these points, then the
foundations of domestic relationsjurisprudence are very shaky indeed.
Although some judges seem to believe otherwise, 141 no consensus
exists about the morality of same-sex relations." Even if a portion
of the population believes that same-sex relations are immoral,'4
that does not establish that such relations are, in fact, immoral. If
that rationale were permissible, interracial relationships would be
136. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
137. SedBowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
138. See id. at 195-96 ("[I]t would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery.... ").
139. The difficulties for couples that are posed by the lack of sexual relations have been
recognized in the law. See Robert Heady, Personal Business Smart Banking- Dollar's Drama Leaves
Investors PerplexedAbout What toDo, ATLANTAJ. & CONsr., Mar. 13,1996, at E2 (stating that sexual
problems had been primary reason for divorce).
140. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
141. SeeCox, supra note 98, at 786 (contrasting society's move toward viewing homosexuality
as morally neutral behavior with that ofjudiciary that has not decided conclusively whether to
follow trend in society to accept individual differences or to force conformity among primary
caretakers).
142. See Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-11, 1988 WL 30173, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1988)
(Tomlin, PJ., concurring) ("Homosexuality... has been and is considered to be an unnatural,
immoral act.").
143. See Constant A. v. Paul CA, 496 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (acknowledging that
many believe same-sex relationships are immoral).
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immoral, as a significant minority believes that such unions are
morally impermissible.1"
The point is not that interracial relationships are immoral; on the
contrary, such relationships are morally permissible, views to the
contrary notwithstanding. Just as interracial couples have been
burdened unfairly because of societal prejudice masked as moral
indignation, same-sex couples have been burdened unfairly because
of societal prejudice masked as moral indignation."
Pgegardless of whether same-sex relations are morally permissible in
an absolute sense, it might seem permissible to enforce the moral
code of the majority, and at least in some states, it seems safe to
assume that the majority of the populace does not approve morally of
same-sex relationships.' Yet, if all state courts ruled according to
majority views in the region, interracial relationships would be at
risk. 47 Fortunately, the Supreme Court has made it clear that states
cannot prohibit interracial unions, moral views of the populace
notwithstanding. 48
Even were there universal agreement that same-sex unions were
immoral, that would not settle the matter. Many of those who believe
morality a legitimate basis for law do not claim that the state has a
compelling interest in the promotion of morality.'49 Lacking a
144. See Cox, supra note 98, at 785 ("Forty-five percent of white Americans responding to a
1991 Gallup poll disapproved of interracial marriages and twenty percent believed such
marriages should be illegal."); see also David Dooley, Comment, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad
Because They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes,
26 CAL W. L. REV. 395, 416 (1990) (commenting that presumption that majority of public
believed interracial marriage was immoral was not sufficient to uphold antimiscegenation
statutes).
145. See Strasser, supra note 127, at 970 (discussing antimiscegenation laws). See generally
Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25
SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 981 (1991); see also 142 CONG. REc. 510, 124 (Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Bradley) (discussing individuals who hide behind scripture to disguise their underlying
intolerance of gays and lesbians).
146. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (declaring that sodomy laws are
reflection of majority sentiments and therefore should not be invalidated); see also Sylvia A. Law,
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187, 192 ("most people
disapprove of people who engage in homosexual conduct."); Arthur A. Murphy et al., Gays in
the Military: Wat About Morality, Ethics, Character, and Honor?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 331,343 (1995)
("The majority of Americans disapprove of homosexuality.").
147. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964) (striking down Florida law that
punished interracial coupling more severely than intra-racial coupling). Presumably, the Florida
populace believed the former worse than the latter. If the general views of the populace were
dispositive in these matters, then the Florida law would have to have been upheld.
148. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967) (holding that states may not prohibit
interracial marriage).
149. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(suggesting that moral concerns are not "particularly 'important' or 'substantial', or amount[]
to anything more than a rational basis for regulation") (emphasis added); David S. Caudill, Legal
Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation: A Proposal to Update and Reconsider Common-Law Marriage,
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compelling state interest, however, states are notjustified in interfering
with a gay or lesbian's fundamental parental rights, absent some
showing of harm to the child.15
As inappropriate as it may be to use the presumed moral view of
the populace to justify the abridgement of fundamental rights, it is
even worse to base decisions on the moral view of an individual
judge.15' As a Massachusetts appellate court pointed out, allowing
individual judges to determine the moral fitness of the proposed
custodian according to their personal, moral, and religious views
would result in different determinations by different judges.152
Although courts may not wish to be told that they should not appoint
themselves as ultimate moral arbiters,"5 ' they nonetheless are" not
particularly well-equipped to decide moral issues. 154  As an Ohio
appellate court explained, a judicial standard requiring the court to
make a distinction between moral and immoral conduct is unwork-
able.155
Some courts and commentators have suggested thatjudges should
refrain from passing moral judgment on proposed custodial parents'
lifestyle choices and should make such judgments only when there is
a "direct and articulable" causal link between the parent's lifestyle and
an adverse impact on the child. 56 The requirement that a causal
connection be established between the parent's "failing" and an
adverse impact on the child is called the nexus test.
C. The Nexus Test
The nexus test requires that a connection between parental
conduct and harm to the child be established if the parent is to be
49 TENN. L. REv. 537, 557 (1982) (asserting that relationship between legislation and public
welfare is more tenuous when laws ascribe to particular views of morality than when laws are
prompted by concern for public safety and security).
150. See supra notes 8-42 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental nature of right to
parent).
151. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties posed by allowing
judges to make such decisions).
152. See Fort v. Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754, 757 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
153. See L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that appellant's plea for
courts to refrain from regulating on basis of morality is "astonishing").
154. SeeJarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 427 (11. 1979) (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting)
(asserting that courts are equipped to decide legal but not moral issues); Note, Joint Adoption:
A Queer Option?, 15 VT. L. REv. 197, 209 (1990) (arguing that personal moral position ofjudge
toward same-sex intimacy should not be enforced as law).
155. SeeWhaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (finding moral norm
impossible to define given "the diversity of religious and moral practice in this country").
156. SeeFort 425 N.E.2d at 757 (stating that judge's personal moral judgments should not
be exercised in determining fitness of custodial parents unless direct and articulable adverse
impact on child can be demonstrated as result of parents' lifestyle).
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deprived of custody because of that conduct.57 Without that nexus,
there will be insufficient grounds to deny custody." Theoretically,
use of the nexus test limits the extent to which the personal biases of
judges play a role in custody determinations.159 Courts may espouse
the nexus test, however, and nonetheless deny custody, even when
there is no evidence of harm.16° Indeed, the mere unsubstantiated
claim that a child will be affected adversely by awarding a gay parent
custody sometimes is held to constitute a sufficient nexus tojustify, the
deprivation of custody.161 A willingness to accept that such a claim
provides a sufficient nexus, however, is simply to ignore the nexus
requirement while pretending to accept it."2
The nexus requirement is designed to prevent courts from
depriving parents of custody based on the mere possibility of
harm," but not to force courts to wait until harm to the child
actually has occurred before depriving a parent of custody.1" The
nexus test strikes a balance between these two poles and limits judicial
determinations of harm to present or reasonably predictable future
effects upon the child." Thus, harm need not have occurred in
157. See Felicia Meyers, Note, Gay Custody and Adoption: An Unequal Application of the Law, 14
WHITrIER L. REv. 839, 842-43 (1993) (explaining that nexus approach rejects "presumption of
unfitness" and requires proof that parent's homosexuality will harm child in demonstrable way).
158. See id. at 843.
159. See David P. Russman, Note, Alternative Families: In MWose Best Interests, 27 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 31, 63-64 (1993) (pointing out that nexus test ensures that courts and agencies will
ignore myths and personal biases that stigmatize gay parenting, unless connection is established
between parent's homosexuality and adverse effects on child).
160. See Marie Weston Evans, Note, Parent and Child: MJ.P. v. J.G.P.: An Analysis of the
Relevance of Parental Homosexuality in Child Custody Determinations, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 633, 653-54
(1982) (discussing court's reasoning in MJ.P. v.J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982), in which
Oklahoma Supreme Court espoused use of nexus requirement but nevertheless upheld custody
modification based on mother's lesbianism absent any evidence of detriment to child resulting
from mother's lifestyle).
161. See Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory
and Litigation Strategy, 25 BuFF. L. REV. 691, 714 (1976) (expressing frustration that courts
enunciate nexus requirements but fail to define requisite strength of causal connection by
accepting proof of lesbian activity or of mere claim of harm as sufficient showing of "adverse
effect").
162. See supra note 160 (discussing situations in which courts espouse use of nexus test but
denied custody absent showing of harm to child).
163. See Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding that harmful
effect on child must be established before fundamental parental right of custody or visitation
may be curtailed based on parent's sexual activity); Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57, 61 (W. Va.
1985) (stating that mere speculation of potential, future harm is impermissible basis for change
of custody).
164. SeeJarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 425 (II. 1979) (arguing that law should not
postpone remedy until manifestations of harm become apparent); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444
S.E.2d 276, 282 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (instructing that nexus rule does not require that harm to
child occur before judicial intervention); reu'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
165. See In reP.I.M., 665 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that it is sensible
to change child's custody at outset if reasonable likelihood of adverse effect is present);
DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637 (App. Div. 1978) (stating that although sexuality
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order for a parent to be deprived of custody, but harm must be
reasonably predictable and not merely possible.
III. HARM TO THE CHILD
When considering whether custody by a parent would be harmful
to a child, courts consider several different types of harm including,
inter alia, physical harm, emotional harm, and moral harm.
Indications of any of these types of harms may provide suffcient
grounds for a parent to be deprived of custody.
A. Physical Harm
Given the growing number of reported child abuse cases,1 c6urts
must be sensitive to concerns that children can be hurt severely or
even killed by their parents. 6 7 When a parent in a custody case is
gay or lesbian, however, courts are more likely to consider the
possibility of sexual molestation than other kinds of physical
abuse." This occurs because many judges still labor under the
misconception that gay men and lesbians are more likely to molest
children than are heterosexual men and women, 69 even though
current empirical data demonstrate that this is not true.7 Indeed,
much evidence suggests that gays and lesbians are less likely than
heterosexual parents to molest children.1 7' Notwithstanding these
of parent properly maybe considered in determining best interest of child, such considerations
must be limited to "present or reasonably predictable effect" on child's welfare).
166. See Child Abuse Statistics Challenge Us to Do Better, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Mar. 20,
1996, atA10 ("Of all the problems facing communities today, none is more disturbing than the
growing number of child abuse cases.").
167. See iL ("Statistics suggest that even more small children than ever before are being
mistreated-even dying-at the hands of their parents or others who are supposed to look after
them.").
168. SeeJ.L.P.(H.) v. DJ.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 867-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (basing denial of
custody on court's own beliefs about molestation by homosexual fathers).
169. SeeShaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parenting. Child Custody and Adoption, 22
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1013-21 (1989) (discussing judicial misconceptions about gays and
lesbians); Evans, supra note 160, at 649-50 (exposing judicial misconceptions of homosexual
parenting, including myth that gays and lesbians are more likely than heterosexual parents to
molest their children).
170. See David KL Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientifc Realities, 3 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 360 (1994) (reporting that homosexuals are no more likely than
heterosexuals to molest or to commit crimes against children).
171. See All, supra note 169, at 1019 (urging courts to consider data that suggests
homosexuals are less likely than heterosexuals to molest children); Darryl Robin Wishard,
Comment, Out of the Closet and into the Courts: Homoseual Fathers and Child Custody, 93 DIcK. L.
REV. 401, 411 (1989) (reporting that studies suggest heterosexual men are more likely than
homosexual men to be culprits of child molestation); see also Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian
and Gay People: The Use and Mis-use of Social Science Research, 2 DUKEJ. GENDER, L. & POLy 207,
216-17 (1995) (citing studies revealing that sex abuse offenders are disproportionately
heterosexual men); David M. Rosenblum, Comment, Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents,
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facts, courts continue to restrict the custodial or visitation rights of gay
or lesbian parents because they fear that such parents will molest their
children. 2
One explanation for these continued restrictions is that courts are
unaware of the relevant data. Some courts, however, blatantly ignore
the relevant data even when it is presented at trial.173 Regrettably,
those courts appear less concerned with preventing molestation than
with punishing gay or lesbian parents. In In re Diehl,74 for example,
an Illinois trial court awarded custody to the heterosexual father over
the lesbian mother, despite some evidence of child abuse. 75 The
court did not find conclusively that the father had molested his
daughter, even though there was evidence that the father had
engaged in inappropriate parenting practices that the court conclud-
ed fell "in the area of poor judgment and should be stopped.'7 67
For example, after watching a television show warning children not to
allow adults to "touch them in inappropriate places,"' 77 the child
had complained, "Daddy still touches me on the butt and it
hurts." 78 Furthermore, the father was advised to let his daughter
bathe in private and to stop sleeping with her while he was dressed in
his undershorts. 79
The Diehl trial court believed the lesbian mother to be a fit
parent,'80 but ruled, "[B] ecause of Jennifer's tender years ... it is
in her best interest not to be exposed to a lesbian relationship."''
The court apparently feared that a child's exposure to an alleged
lesbian relationship might be too harmful'82 and felt more comfort-
able awarding custody to the father, evidence of "inappropriate
behavior" notwithstanding.
36 ViLL. L. REv. 1665, 1684 (1991) (citing studies revealing that majority of child molestations
are committed by heterosexuals with female victims).
172. SeeJ.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 867-69 (ignoring expert evidence of psychologists and
instead relying on court's own beliefs about likelihood of molestation by homosexual father).
173. See id.; see also M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1261 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)
(criticizing trial judge for rejecting expert testimony that fully supported lesbian mother's
continued custody).
174. 582 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
175. See In re Diehl, 582 N.E. 2d 281, 283 (11l. App. Ct. 1991).





180. See id. at 288 (finding that both parents exhibited "requisite parenting skills").
181. Id. at 289.
182. See id. (explaining that, given child's youngage, she may be incapable of making choices
and understanding differences in sexual preferences).
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In Bottoms v. Bottoms,' a Virginia court awarded custody of a
child to a grandmother whose live-in boyfriend had been accused by
the child's mother of having molested her when she was a child."
Although the grandmother conceded that the accusations against her
companion "were not altogether unfounded,""a the trial court
nevertheless awarded custody to the grandmother primarily because
the mother was "living in an open lesbian relationship" with her
partner.186  The court also focused on the fact that the child's
mother and her partner engaged in the illegal act of sodomy in -the
home they shared with the child,"8 7 although never in the child's
presence. a The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
decision, finding insufficient evidence of parental unfitness to aWard
custody of the child to a nonparent 9 The Supreme Court of
Virginia, however, accepted the trial court's findings that the mother
was unfit and that custody of the child should be awarded to the
grandmother.90 It seems that both the trial court and the state
supreme court were less concerned about protecting the child than
they were about punishing the mother.
B. Emotional Harm and Psychological Damage
The potential for emotional harm to the child is another important
consideration in custody disputes. 9' Emotional harm may be
indicated by the child's being depressed,'92 having few friends, 193
183. 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), reu'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
184. SeeBottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 278-79 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102
(Va. 1995).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 280.
187. See id. at 281 (noting that only significant factors considered by trial judge in
determining parent's fitness were mother's open lesbian relationship and her illegal sexual
activities).
188. See id. at 279 (accepting testimony of mother that she never had exposed child to any
type of sexual activity).
189. See id. at 276.
190. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107 (Va. 1995) (stating that court of appeals
failed to give proper deference to trial court's factual findings), revg 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct
App. 1994).
191. See M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 966-67 (App. Div. 1986) (stating that parent's
activities with romantic companion, whether homosexual or heterosexual, cannot be deemed
improper in custodial context unless child is affected emotionally).
192. SeeWhite v. Olson, No. C3-95-1194, 1995 WL 536420, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12,
1995) (indicating that evidence of children's depression to point of discussing suicide warrants
custodial change).
193. SeeBrandt v. Brandt, 425 N.E.2d 1251, 1256, 1264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (citing testimony
by child that she had no friends and indicating court's unwillingness to place child in living
situation that might compound child's psychological problems).
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or perhaps, by the child not fulfilling his or her potential in
school.I9 In extreme cases, gross physical symptoms can be a
manifestation of emotional difficulties. 95
Courts must be careful, however, not to make assumptions about
the cause of the unhappiness when confronted by a child who is
emotionally upset. 96 A depressed child whose custodial parent is
divorced and in a committed, same-sex relationship might be upset,
in fact, by his or her parents' divorce and the loss of the noncustodial
parent, rather than by the custodial parent's subsequent same-sex
relationship. 97 This type of situation is heavily fact-dependent and
requires an objective, unbiased judge to determine where the best
interests of the child lie. Although cases exist in which a modification
of custody would improve the child's emotional situation, in other
cases a change in custody would only cause further harm by subject-
ing the child to further upheaval. 9 A judge who assumes that any
emotional irregularity must have been caused by the same-sex
relationship of one of the parents might well sacrifice the child's
interests by refusing to consider the other possibilities.
Yet another danger is that judges will assume that a parent's same-
sex relationship will harm the child emotionally, even when no evidence
is available. In Pennington v. Pennington,1" for example, an Indiana
court used the mother's unsubstantiated testimony speculating about
the father's "possible homosexuality" and photographs of a
Valentine's Day card exchanged between the father and a male friend
as grounds for restricting the father's visitation.2" The father
denied that the relationship was homosexual and the mother
admitted that she had never witnessed any "impropriety" between the
two."0 1 A court's restricting visitation would be reasonable in certain
circumstances, for example, if the parent were exposing the child to
194. See In reJane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (referring to diagnosis
of child who was not fulfilling her potential at school as emotionally upset and concluding that
because home environment caused emotional problems, change in custody was warranted).
195. See Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that absence of
emotional interaction and bonding between parent and child may result in deficiencies in
child's physical development, such as subnormal height and weight).
196. See Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (noting that courts
may grant changes of custody when child is troubled and custodial parent engages in "immoral"
conduct without establishing causal connection between two situations).
197. SeeJane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (recognizing that parents' divorce itself could be causing
child's troubled emotional state).
198. For example, given that the mother and child in Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va.
Ct. App. 1994), had a close loving relationship, see id. at 279, it would not be surprising for the
child to have been affected detrimentally by the change in custody.
199. 596 N.E.2d 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
200. See Pennington v. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
201. See id.
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explicit sexual activity. Such an approach is not reasonable, however,
when a court bars all contact between the child and the father's
friend when there has been no evidence of any impropriety or any
emotional harm. 2
The Pennington court concluded that the father's friend's potential
presence during the child's visits would be emotionally harmful to the
child based on the mother's suspicions about the father's relationship
with his friend03 and on the father's "demeanor" as observed by the
court.2" Given that there was no evidence of harm to the child, the
court simply could have ordered that no sexual practices take place
in front of the child (despite the utter lack of evidence that such an
order would be necessary).2"5 The court's claim that the child's
emotional health justified the limitation was likely a pretext for
imposing a limitation on the father and his friend rather than a
genuine concern based on an independent factual basis.206
1. Exposure to sexual practices
Although generally agreeing that explicit sexual behavior should
not take place in front of children, courts have been less than clear
about which behaviors are permissible displays of affection rather than
proscribed sexual activities." 7 For many courts, the line of demarca-
tion between sexual activity which is inappropriate in front of a
child2" and that which merely involves a harmless demonstration of
affection 2" is a hazy one. Some courts explicitly reject the idea that
202. See id. (pointing out that no evidence of impropriety between father and his male friend
was presented).
203. See id. at 305-06 (discussing mother's suspicions). But see id. at 307 (Robertson, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to majority's reliance on suspicions without any showing of endangerment
to child).
204. See id. at 307.
205. See id. (Robertson,J., dissenting) (discussing the "far too weak" evidentiary basis upon
which trial court's decision was based).
206. See id. (deferring to trial court's assessment of father's testimony and demeanor and
failing to cite any independent factual basis in support of its decision).
207. See Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining decision to
affirm joint custody award by pointing out that sex play involving parents never occurred in
child's presence); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 283 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasizing
absence of evidence that lesbian mother had engaged in illegal sexual behavior in child's
presence to support trial court's decision to grant mother custody).
208. See Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 894 (S.D. 1992) (describing intimate acts
performed by mother and lover which court believed dearly were inappropriate in front of
child).
209. SeePleasantv. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 642 (IlL App. Ct. 1993) (stating that wimessing
two consenting adults hug and kiss one another is not harmful to child). But see Flaks, supra
note 170, at 352 (providing examples of courts that are especially disapproving of custodial
situations in which homosexual partners display affection toward each other in children's pres-
ence).
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casual hugging and kissing in a friendly manner is inappropriate; 10
other courts have disapproved of such displays of affection and have
used evidence of such acts to deny custody.
211
A further distinction should be made. Some kinds of affection are
not inappropriately displayed in front of a child,212 even though
people who are just friends might not choose to express their
affection for each other in that manner.218 For example, in Bottoms,
the mother and her partner "displayed some affection in the child's
presence by hugging, kissing, or patting one another on the bot-
tom. 21 4 This kind of display will not harm the child and, presum-
ably, the court would have had no qualms about the display of such
behavior if the individuals had been married to one another.215
Sometimes, a court's disapproval of such affection in a child's
presence is not that the display itself would harm the child, but rather
that it is affection between unmarried individuals and thus represents
"immoral" behavior.
216
When a court chastises a couple for exposing a child to a display of
affection that would have been perfectly acceptable had the couple
been married, it clearly is not the activity but rather the relationship
of the parties that is objectionable. Perhaps the best illustration of
the personal moral biases of some judges is the weight given to
evidence that nonmarried partners merely said that they loved each
other in front of a child. 7 One court questioned the child in-
volved about such verbal exchanges in an attempt to prove the
210. See Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 642 ("Seeing two consenting adults hug and kiss in a friendly
manner is not harmful ... ").
211. See Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 764 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that mother's
hugging and kissing her female partner in front of her son was harmful and an appropriate basis
for changing custody).
212. See Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279 (implying that "hugging, kissing, or patting one another
on the bottom" are permissible). But see Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 764 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that affection displayed by mother and her partner "in the presence of the children
went beyond the casual exchange of affections which might be expected in close female
friendships").
213. See Scott, 665 So. 2d at 764 (noting that affection displayed by mother and her partner
went beyond exchange that might be expected in close friendship).
214. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
215. See id at 281 (justifying denial of custody to parent with non-marital live-in companion
by "explaining" that parental behavior influences children's "values and views" as to what is
acceptable" behavior and conduct).
216. See Lasseigne v. Lasseigne, 434 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (implying that
signs of affection between defendant and woman who is not his wife represent immoral
behavior).
217. See Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-I, 1988 WL 30173, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30,
1988) (Tomlin, PJ., concurring) (relating child's testimony in which court questions child about
whether mother and lesbian lover hug, kiss, and "tell each other that they love each other" to
determine whether child was exposed to homosexual "activities").
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existence of homosexual acts. To classify such statements as inappropri-
ate sexual activity is simply to conflate two different activities."1
Courts make a further distinction when examining whether the
sexual behavior of parents is appropriate. Some courts consider only
behavior that the child sees to be relevant,219 although other courts
object even if the child does not see or hear the activity but merely is
in the same house where the behavior occurs.22 ° Certainly, the two
situations are quite different and should not be treated in the same
way. This inconsistency may mean that relatively similar situations
might be treated quite differently because one court interprets the
sexual activity factor to include any activity that occurs while the child
is in the home and another court limits the factor to include only
activity seen by the child. 21
2. Housing
Historically, courts have imposed numerous visitation restrictions
when a parent cohabits with a nonmarital partner regardless of the
parent's sexual orientation.222 Some courts even have prohibited
the partner from staying overnight while the children are visiting,
even though the partner permanently resides there. 23 Other times,
courts have required not only that the parent's same-sex partner not
be there during visitation, but also that the partner move out
218. SeeStrasser, supranote 6, at397 (discussing individuals who were punished forwhat they
said rather than what they did).
219. SeeA. v.A., 514 P.2d 358, 360 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (articulating absence of evidence that
children were "exposed to deviant sexual acts"); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705-06
(S.C. CL App. 1987) (pointing out that daughter has her own bedroom and is not exposed to
"deviant sexual acts").
220. See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 691 (Va. 1985) (concluding that child's best interests
are not advanced by awarding custody to parent who "carries on an active homosexual
relationship in the same residence as the child"); Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89, 92 (Va. 1977)
(justifying shift in custody because couple was "openly cohabiting in the presence of her two
young children"). But see Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 642 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating
that only relevance of custodial parent living with homosexual partner is whether child is
adversely affected by that cohabitation).
221. See supra note 220.
222. See infra notes 223-25.
223. See Irish v. Irish, 300 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming trial court's
order that children could not stay overnight at mother's house if her lesbian lover also spent
night); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (precluding father from
allowing live-in homosexual partner to visit overnight during visitation by children); Carrico v.
Blevins, 402 S.E.2d 235,237 (Va. CL App. 1991) (ordering mother to refrain from having live-in
male partner sleep overnight during visitation).
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entirely. 24 At least one court went so far as to specify that the
parent not live with any adult of the same sex.2"
Courts do not consider only current housing arrangements, but
also may consider whether the parent has future plans to move in
with a nonmarital partner.22  Courts claim that by factoring
nonmarital housing arrangements into custody determinations, they
prevent children from harm caused by exposure to "immoral"
conduct,227 although they may be inconsistent with respect to
whether they will prevent such exposure. For example, a court
deciding who shall have custody may consider a parent's plan to live
with a partner a neutral factor if that person is of the opposite sex
and a negative factor if that person is of the same sex, even when
there is no plan to marry in either case.2 In Bottoms, the mother
lost custody because of her "immoral" and "illegal" relationship with
her same-sex partner.229 Ironically, the grandmother who gained
custody also had an immoral and illegal2" relationship-she lived
with a male companion without benefit of marriage.3 ' This case is
but one example in which the laws were not applied equally, as a
child was removed from one household where "immoral" and "illegal"
conduct took place and placed in another household where "immor-
al" and "illegal" conduct took place.
224. See Larroquette v. Larroquette, 293 So. 2d 628, 629 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (dictating that
no visitation should be allowed in home of father who lives with "concubine" and noting that
"hypocritical removal" of partner at visitation time does not transform home into "respectable
place of residence"); see also Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests Men a
Parent Is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REv. 852, 867-69 (1985)
(discussing restrictions placed on homosexual parents' intimate associations by court-ordered
custody arrangements).
225. See In reDiehl, 582 N.E.2d 281, 294 (Ill. App. CL 1991) (criticizing overbreadth of trial
court's order that visitation shall take place without presence of "any other female" with whom
mother may be residing).
226. SeeJacobson v.Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80-81 (N.D. 1981) (citing trial court's finding
that mother has future plans to live with lesbian partner in support of its decision to deny
custody).
227. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107 (Va. 1995) (discussing trial court's wish to
prevent child from being exposed to "immoral" conduct).
228. CompareJacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (mother deprived of custody because she lived with
same-sex lover), withLapp v. Lapp, 336 N.W. 2d 350 (N.D. 1983) (father not deprived of custody
despite living with woman to whom he was not married). In Lapp, the court expressly
distinguishedJacobson by pointing out that the mother in that case had been involved in a same-
sex relationship. See Lapp, 336 N.W.2d at 352.
229. See Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 107 (referring to mother's lesbian relationship).
230. Fornication is illegal in Virginia. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 1996) ("Any
person, not being married, who voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse with any other person,
shall be guilty of fornication."). Lewd and lascivious cohabitation also is illegal. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-345. The latter statute is violated when the openness and notoriety of the conduct
affront the public conscience. See Everett v. Commonwealth, 200 S.E.2d 564, 566 (Va. 1973).
231. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 278-79 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
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Indeed, Bottoms illustrates just how unequal the application can be.
There, a third party living in an allegedly immoral, illegal relationship
nonetheless was able to bear the "heavy burden of persuasion 2
32
necessary to convince a court that the natural parent should be
denied custody.233 The only apparent difference was that the parent
had a same-sex partner and the third party had an opposite-sex
partner.M
Courts not only impose visitation restrictions in situations involving
a parent's current or planned cohabitation, but also occasionally bar
unmarried partners wlio maintain separate residences from staying
overnight while the child is visiting.2 5 Yet, it should be clear that
this can result in great abuse. For example, in Commonwealth ex rel.
Drum v. Drum,2 6 a mother did not want her children to visit their
father (her estranged husband) at times when her husband's mistress
(the mother's former friend) was present.2 7  Certainly, it was not
surprising that the wife bore her ex-friend ill will.23 There was no
evidence, however, that the father's mistress had harmed the children
by her presence, 239 and it was not at all clear that the children's best
interests were promoted by preventing contact.2 ° Further, because
the mistress and husband had planned to marry when the divorce was
final,241 it was doubtful that the restriction would have been particu-
larly effective or long-lasting.
The willingness of courts to impose visitation restrictions on
nonmarital partners, even absent any evidence of harm, poses special
difficulties for gay and lesbian parents. 242 Because same-sex partners
cannot marry, such restrictions may prevent a partner from ever
232. Gerald D. v. Peggy R., No. C-9101, 79-12-143-CV, 1980 WL 20452, at *5 (Del. Fam. Ct.
Nov. 17, 1980).
233. See Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 278 ("A non-parent is granted custody over a parent only when
the parent is unfit to have custody of the child or when continued custody with the parent will
be deleterious to the child.").
234. See Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 105.
235. See Commonwealth ix. reL Drum v. Drum, 397 A.2d 1192, 1194 (Pa. Super. Ct 1979)
(affirming lower court order that visitations occur outside company of unmarried partner).
236. 397 A.2d 1192 (1979).
237. See Drum, 397 A.2d at 1195 (Spaeth,J., dissenting).
238. See iUL at 1196 (Spaeth, J., dissenting) ("[1]t would be astonishing if she were not
resentful of someone who, while purportedly her best friend, has, as she must see it, stolen her
husband and destroyed her family.").
239. See id at 1199 (Spaeth, J., dissenting) (noting that there was no evidence of lover's
presence adversely affecting children).
240. See i. (Spaeth,J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 1195 (Spaeth,J., dissenting).
242. But see Diehl v. Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281, 292 (Ill. App. 1991) (arguing that approach is
"sexual orientation neutral").
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getting to know the parent's child, even when the partner played no
role in the break-up of the marriage.2"
Regrettably, courts might welcome the fact that such restrictions
may prevent the partner and the parent's child from getting to know
each other and thus from deriving the mutual benefits that might
arise from such contact. Many courts do not appear interested solely
in shielding the child from reasonably predictable harm.2" Indeed,
courts sometimes bar any gay or lesbian adult,24 or perhaps, any
same-sex nonrelative, 246 from being in the child's presence.
It would be unfair to say that courts fashion overbroad restrictions
only when gays or lesbians are involved.247 For example, a visitation
order preventing a man from having his children at night in the
presence of any woman not his wife obviously is overbroad, because
it might preclude the fathers from taking the children to their
grandmother's house for a weekend visit.21 If the objective of the
courts truly were to prevent actual or likely harm to the child,249 the
order would reflect that goal by limiting visitation with the particular
person whose presence the court found would be harmful to the
child.25°
For gay and lesbian parents, there is little comfort in learning that
courts have imposed similarly overbroad restrictions on other classes
of people. Knowledge that unfair burdens are imposed on more than
243. See Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tenn. App. 1981) (prohibiting mother from
having child in presence of any homosexual with whom she may have lesbian relationship).
244. See supra notes 173-90 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which "best interests"
standard was not used).
245. See Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (App. Div. 1985) (Kupferman, J.,
concurring) (noting that lower court conditioned visitation privileges on complete exclusion of
parent's partner and other homosexuals from contact with child); In rejane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d
848, 860-61 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (requiring that child not be taken where known homosexuals were
present). See generaUy Susoeff, supra note 224, at 867 (observing that child often is required to
be kept out of presence of parent's lover and homosexual friends).
246. See N.K.M. v. LE.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (approving of trial
court's decision to condition custody on mother ending cohabitating with non-related females).
247. See Wilson v. Wilson, 341 P.2d 780, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (affirming trial court's
order forbidding visitation when unmarried friend was present); Fulwiler v. Fulwiler, 538 P.2d
958,960 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (affirming trial court's order prohibiting visitation when unmarried
partner was present).
248. See Duplantis v. Monteaux, 412 So. 2d 215, 218 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that order
of trial court could prevent visitations from taking place at night in the presence of child's
grandmother and close relatives). But see Palmer v. Palmer, 416 A.2d 143, 145 (Vt. 1980)
(pointing out that reading visitation limitations so narrowly would violate clear intent of order).
249. See Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 640 (I1. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that parent
seeking restriction has burden of showing by preponderance of evidence that current visitation
is harmful to child).
250. See Gallo v. Gallo, 440 A.2d 782, 787 (Conn. 1981) (modifying overnight visitation
restriction to apply only to particular woman with whom defendant was living at time of
hearing).
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one class does not somehow lessen the burden. As the Supreme
Court has stated, "Equal protection of the laws is not achieved
through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."25'
The fact that courts impose overly broad restrictions on several
classes may help allay fears that gays and lesbians are being subjected
to invidiously discriminatory restrictions." Regrettably, such fears
are well-founded, as the overbroad restrictions sometimes are different
in kind when gays or lesbians are involved. For example, when courts
prevent nonrelatives of the opposite sex from being present when
children visit an unmarried heterosexual parent, the court presumably
is attempting to prevent the child from exposure to meretricious
relationships by limiting contact with a potential sex partner of the
parent. Orders involving gay or lesbian parents, however, sometimes
go much further and prohibit exposure to all "known homosexuals"
regardless of whether the parent would be physically attracted to
those individuals.25 Some courts, for example, have prohibited a
child from being present when a lesbian has contact with gay male
friends or a gay man has contact with a lesbian. 4 This shows that
when gays or lesbians are involved, courts may be concerned not only
with preventing exposure to the parent's relationships, but also with
preventing all contact with people who identify themselves as
homosexual. These judges apparently believe that exposure to gays
and lesbians somehow will "contaminate" the children despite
evidence to the contrary. 5
3. Alienation
One reason that courts may restrict the presence of a parent's
nonmarital partner during visitation is the fear that a relationship with
251. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
252. For a discussion of whether gays and lesbians are subjected to invidiously discriminatory
treatment and whether they should be held to constitute a suspect class, see Mark Strasser,
Suspect Classe and Suspect Classificati ns: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Othenise, 64 TEMPLE L.
REV. 937 (1991) (questioning court's reluctance to recognize homosexuals as suspect class).
253. See Gotlieb v. Gottlieb, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (App. Div. 1985) (Kupferman, J.,
concurring) (reinforcing trial court's order that child not be taken where "known homosexuals"
were present).
254. See Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 637 (discussing lower court opinion that precluded mother
from visiting her son in presence of any person of "known homosexual tendencies");J.L.P.(H.)
v. D.L.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. 1992) (suggesting that it would be appropriate to prohibit
"father's exercise of visitation in presence of known homosexuals"); In rejane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d
848, 861 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (allowing mother to visit child so long as child was not taken anywhere
where "known homosexuals are present").
255. See infra notes 168-206 (discussing misconceptions about alleged harmful effects that
gays and lesbians will have on children).
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the partner will supplant the one the child has with the other
parent.16 Courts generally believe that it is in the best interest of
the child to have a relationship with both parents, and that partners
who impede the relationship with the other parent adversely affect
that interest"25  As an Oregon appellate court observed, "[I]t is
essential that the parents do nothing to intentionally interfere with
the bonds of love and affection the child may develop for each
parent."' Regrettably, however, courts do not enforce this obliga-
tion uniformly.
Although courts may accept that a divorced parent generally has a
duty not to alienate the child from the other parent,259 they may
make an exception if the alienation "has its foundation in the
conduct of the complaining parent."2" Because many parents who
alienate their children from the other parent believe the other parent
is responsible, for example, because he or she is a bad person,26'
the question then may become whether the alienation is justified,262
although this exception must be properly understood. As the North
Dakota Supreme Court pointed out, "[A] custodial parent should, in
the best interests of the children, nurture the children's relationship
with the noncustodial parent" "[n]otvithstanding the [latter's]
perceived imperfections."2" Interference with custody will not be
justified merely because one parent suspects the other parent of
wrongdoing.26
256. See DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (App. Div. 1978) (modifying custody
order after determining that mother's nonmarital partner made repeated efforts to alienate
children from their father).
257. See Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (Fla. 1991) (emphasizing importance of
child's frequent and continuous contact with both mother and father after marriage dissolves).
258. In re Birge, 579 P.2d 297, 299 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
259. See L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that child's alienation
as result of custodial parent's intentional conduct demonstrates major breach of parental
responsibility). But see Nancy Polikoff, Educating Judges About Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A
Simulation, 1 L. & SEXuALnY 173, 190-91 (1991) (discussing how one parent's portraying the
other parent negatively solely because of the latter's sexual orientation can be used to
undermine the former's deserving custody).
260. 630 S.W.2d at 243.
261. See Birg, 579 P.2d at 299 (finding that father used child as weapon in his attempt to
punish mother for supposed transgressions).
262. See Kahn v. Kahn, 252 A.2d 901,902 (D.C. 1969) (modifying custody order after finding
that mother had tried to alienate child from father withoutjustification); see also In re Downing,
432 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (discussing Iowa law that makes "denial by one
parent of the child's opportunity for maximum continuing contact with the other parent,
ithoutjust cause, a significant factor in determining the proper custody arrangements" (citing
IOWA CODE § 598.41(1) (1987))).
263. Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 834 (N.D. 1993).
264. See Kerby v. Kerby, 792 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (asserting that behavior
of mother who deliberately alienated her child by interfering with visitation based on her
unfounded suspicion of child abuse, would not be condoned).
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In McAdams v. McAdams, the ex-wife "admitted she let air out
of a moving van's tires when [her ex-husband] moved" and the trial
court found that "she may have ransacked [her ex-husband's]
apartment after he left."2" Further, evidence was presented that
she had physically abused one of the children.267 Nonetheless, the
ex-husband was notjustified in subsequently convincing his older son
to sever his relationship with his mother.2" Furthermore, the father
was not permitted to benefit from his acts by gaining custody. As the
North Dakota Supreme Court explained, a "parent who willfully
alienates a child from the other parent may not be awarded custody
based on that alienation."
269
Ironically, the McAdams court cited with approval a case it had
decided two years earlier, Johnson v. Schlotman.2 In Schlotman, the
court awarded custody to the father over a lesbian mother despite
evidence that he had expressed in front of the children his views that
the mother's homosexual lifestyle was "deviant and . . .not to be
tolerated." '' Certainly, if a parent has a duty to nurture the
relationship with the other parent, one would expect a court neither
to tolerate the inculcation of such attitudes of hate nor to allow a
parent to benefit from such a breach of his or her parental duty,
especially because the court in the same opinion recognized that a
parent has a duty not to turn a child away from the other parent.
Nonetheless, the court was persuaded that because the view was not
the ex-husband's view "exclusively,"2 2 his expression of intolerant
views to his children did not breach his duty to "nurture the
children's relationship with the noncustodial parent."273 Further,
the court accepted the trial court's finding that the husband had not
"poisoned the children's minds," because he was not the "sole cause
of the children's discomfort" with their mother and her partner. 4
Apparently, the court overlooked that such a rule would imply that a
parent who was even partially responsible for causing a child to have
bad feelings about him or her thereby would immunize the other
265. 530 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1995).
266. McAdams v. McAdams, 530 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1995).
267. See id.
268. See id. at 650.
269. I.
270. See id. (citingJohnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 834 (N.D. 1993)).
271. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d at 834.
272. Id
273. Id
274. Id. (emphasis added).
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parent from charges of parental alienation.275 For example, if the
ex-wife in McAdams were responsible at all for alienating her own
children, then Schlotman would seem to require that the husband not
be penalized for contributing to the children's alienation from their
mother, although the North Dakota Supreme Court cited Schlotman
for the opposite proposition. 6
It also is instructive to compare Schlotman to In re Birge,2" in which
an Oregon court awarded a mother custody because the father had
alienated the child, even though the mother did not have an
"exemplary" home life.278  After the couple's divorce, the mother
had lived with her new fianc6 during the time the child would visit
and "[o]n occasion, she, her fianc6 and the child all share[d] the
same bed."279 Presumably, many members of the community would
not have approved of the sleeping arrangements or of the relation-
ship. In this case, however, the court declined to "pass moral judg-
ment."28°  Had the Oregon court adopted a Schlotman-like analysis
and ignored the father's actions because of the mother's questionable
living arrangements, the result would have been quite different.
When a court holds that parental conduct was not in fact alienat-
ing, it is difficult to determine whether the court has assessed the
situation accurately. One can look at other cases to see if similar
conduct constituted alienation,"' but such determinations are
extremely fact-specific.282 In L. v. D.,2" the Missouri Court of
Appeals upheld the lower court, finding the aggrieved, parent
responsible for the child's alienation.284 When a trial court finds
275. But seeWard v. Ward, 353 P.2d 895, 900 (Ariz. 1960) (noting significance of mother and
new husband's efforts to undermine child's respect for his father).
276. Accord McAdams v. McAdams, 530 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D. 1995) (holding that parent
who willfully alienates child from other parent may be denied custody on that basis).
277. 579 P.2d 297 (Or. App. 1978).
278. See In re Birge, 579 P.2d 297, 299 (Or. App. 1978).
279. Id. But see Larroquette v. Larroquette, 293 So. 2d 628, 629 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (finding
visitation harmful when father lived in "open concubinage" and child shared bed with father and
his partner on overnight visits).
280. Birge, 597 P.2d at 299.
281. Compare L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding insufficient evidence
of alienation when father moved without notifying mother and neglected to give her his new
residential phone number), aith In reQuirk-Edwards, 509 N.W.2d 476,479 (Iowa 1993) (finding
sufficient evidence of alienation when mother failed to notify ex-husband of her address or
telephone number).
282. In L. v. D., for example, the mother knew the father's office number. See 630 S.W.2d
at 241. It is likely, however, that the mother still was unable to speak to her children. In Quirk-
Edwards, the mother's failure to consult with the noncustodial parent before her move was a
significant factor that indicated she was alienating the child from her father. See 509 N.W.2d
at 479.
288. 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
284. See id. at 242-43 (suggesting that children may have been alienated by mother's own
actions).
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that "any contact between [the mother's current lover] or any other
lesbian lover of the appellant and the children would, in fact, impair
their emotional developnent,"2" however, one cannot be confident of
the court's objectivity when finding that the mother rather than the
father was responsible for the alienation of the children.
C. Moral Harm
Courts may limit the exposure of children to nonmarital partners
based on the fear that the child will suffer present or future moral
harm.28 A Missouri appellate court, for example, argued that
courts "cannot ignore the effect which the sexual conduct of a parent
may have on a child's moral development."2 7 Similarly, in Bottoms
v. Bottoms,2" a Virginia appellate court pointed out that a "parent's
behavior and conduct in the presence of a child influences and affects
the child's values and views as to the type of behavior and conduct
that the child will find acceptable."289 Yet the relevant question is
whether or how the parent's effect on the child's views and values
might constitute harm.
Deprivation of custody is understandable when there is evidence
that the child is suffering.2 ° In many cases, however, a child who
is doing well29 nonetheless will be removed from the parent
because of the parent's same-sex relationship.2 92 At least one court
has suggested that even if the majority of society disapproves of the
parent's relationship, that fact alone may not justify a denial of
285. Id at 245 (emphasis added).
286. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ill. 1979) (discussing dangers posed by
waiting several years to determine child's home environment).
287. GA v. DA, 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see also T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784
S.W.2d 281, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (emphasizing that mother's sexual orientation never will
be a neutral factor in development of child's character).
288. 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), reu'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
289. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276,281 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), reu'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va.
1995).
290. See In rejacinta M., 764 P.2d 1827, 1380 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (finding parent's sexual
conduct relevant in deciding custody when compelling evidence was presented that such
conduct affected child's best interests).
291. See Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279 (acknowledging that child and mother had close, loving
relationship and that mother provided adequate food, clothing, and shelter); Collins v. Collins,
No. 87-238, 1988 WL 30173, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (recognizing that mother
provided sufficiently for her daughter).
292. See, e.g., Co!ins, 1988 WL 80178, at *1 (modifying custody order despite mother's
admirable parenting efforts); Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948, 953 (Utah 1994) (disapproving
of trial court's custody despite fact that child was "thriving" in care of her mother during
temporary custody); Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 107 (awarding custody to grandparent despite loving
relationship between mother and child).
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custody.29 It thus is surprising that courts may modify custody
because the parent is in a relationship that is morally controver-
sial.2" It is even more surprising when rights that are described as
fundamental29 and as rooted in "nature and human instinct"296
suddenly are described as mere "technical" rights297 when gay or
lesbian parents are involved.
Courts recognize that one parent's wishes alone should not be used
to limit the custody or visitation of the other parent.2 8 Further,
some courts have stated that "[e]vidence of one parent's homosexuali-
ty, without a link to detriment to the child, is insufficient to constitute
harm."299  Thus, in many states, courts will look to see whether a
same-sex relationship has an adverse effect on the child before
denying custody on that account,3°' because determinations of
custody generally are not based on sexual preference alone."0 ' The
requirement that there be an adverse effect would have little
meaning, however, if the confusion that might result from one
parent's condemning the other parent's relationship would suffice to
establish harm. °2 Recognizing this difficulty, a California appellate
court clearly stated that "the opposing moral positions of the parties,
or the outright condemnation of one parent's beliefs by the other
293. SeeBrandt v. Brandt, 425 N.E.2d 1251, 1262 (IMI. App. Ct. 1981) (stating that affront to
public morality is only additional element to be considered when assessing child's best interests).
294. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text (discussing lack of consensus regarding
morality of same-sex relations).
295. See supra notes 9-42 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental nature of right to
parent).
296. In reJ. P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982).
297. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108.
298. See Duplantis v. Monteaux, 412 So. 2d 215, 221 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (Foret, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting notion that restriction should be imposed for no reason other than
because mother insisted on it); DeVita v. DeVita, 366 A.2d 1350,1354 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976) (observing that parent's personal wishes do not govern conditions of custody).
299. Birdsall v. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290-91 (Ct. App. 1988); see also Large v. Large,
No. 93AP-735, 1993 WL 498127, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1993) (pointing out that, despite
mother's lesbian relationship, loving and nurturing atmosphere helped children deal with
situation). But see Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (finding
sufficient showing of harm even without specific evidence that child was harmed by living with
lesbian mother).
300. See Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Mass. 1980) (concluding that
determination of whether parent is unfit must be based on harmful parental behavior); In re
Adoption of Child byJ.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (commenting
that prior to denying custody, several states require proof that parent's sexual orientation
adversely affects child).
301. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 281 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that parent's
homosexuality does not create presumption of unfitness for custody), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va.
1995); Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (noting that, as a matter of law, parents are not unfit merely
because they are homosexual); see also Evans, supra note 86, at 651 (stating that fundamental
rights of parents should not be denied or restricted on basis of sexual orientation alone).
302. See supra notes 270-76 and accompanying text (discussing case in which ex-husband
disapproved of his ex-wife's lesbian relationship).
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parent's religion, which may result in confusion for the child, do not
provide an adequate basis for restricting visitation rights."303
If disagreement between the parents about the morality of same-sex
relationships does not constitute harm, then it is important to
establish what does constitute harm to the child, if only to provide a
check on courts that seem determined to find harm regardless of the
underlying facts.'" For example, in Pleasant v. Pleasant,"'5 an
Illinois trial court "found that having [the child] in the presence of
gays and lesbians was endangering his gender identity and morals and
not in his best interests."0 6 The appellate court, however, reversed
because there was no factual basis for such a finding.0 7 Further,
the appellate court in this case decided that sexual orientation is
irrelevant unless it "directly harms" the child.0 '
In general, courts require detriment to the child before depriving
the parent of custody, whether the "illicit" relationship involves a
same-sex or an opposite-sex unmarried couple."°  Nevertheless,
some courts refuse to see the analogy between same-sex and opposite-
sex unmarried couples and continue to deny gay or lesbian parents
custody or visitation rights without indications of harm.310 For
example, in Constant A. v. Paul C.A.,"1' a Pennsylvania court recog-
nized that in a custody dispute between two parents, the "paramount
consideration is the welfare of the children."3 2 The court, however,
refused to limit its consideration to "the best interest of the children,
as it related to the [lesbian] mother's parenting capacity,"13 as if
use of that standard somehow would be unrelated to the "paramount
consideration" of promoting the children's welfare. Indeed, the court
in Constant A. rejected the nexus test,314 although the court arguably
303. Birdsa, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91.
304. See, e.g., L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that child's
contact with any lesbian lover will in fact cause harm).
305. 628 N.E.2d 633 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993).
306. Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 638 (Ii1. App. Ct. 1993).
307. See id. at 642-43; see also infra notes 401-48 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
discretion).
308. PleasanA 628 N.E.2d at 642.
309. See, eg., Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Mass. 1980) (explaining that same-
sex relationship does not make parent unfit to further welfare of child unless parental behavior
adversely affects child); In reBurrell, 388 N.E.2d 738, 739 (Ohio 1979) (declaring that opposite-
sex relationship between unmarried people does not warrant denial of custody unless
detrimental impact on child is demonstrated).
310. See Constant A. v. Paul CAL, 496 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that
homosexuality is relevant in any custody dispute).
311. 496 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
312. Id. at 9.
313. Id. at 2-3.
314. See id. at 5; see also supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text (explaining "nexus test").
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would have reached the same result even if it had accepted that test,
because the court found it "inconceivable" that the children could be
"exposed to [the mother's lesbian] relationship and not suffer some
emotional disturbance, perhaps severe."" 5 Thus, even if the court
had limited its consideration to the promotion of the children's
welfare, the court presumably still would have refused to allow the
mother to have custody, given the court's inability to imagine that the
mother's relationship would not be detrimental to her children.
If the Constant A. court had required evidence of actual or likely
harm as the other courts have done,3 16 then the result would have
been different. As a general matter, it should be very difficult to
deprive parents of the custody of their children when those children
are thriving,317 especially if there is no reason to believe that some-
thing terrible would befall the children sometime in the future.
Certainly, if there is reason to think that something terrible will occur
in the future, courts should not wait until the harm has occurred.
Because there is ample evidence that children of gay or lesbian
parents are as healthy as those with heterosexual parents,3 1 howev-
er, it will not suffice to assume that a detrimental effect will manifest
in the child sometime in the future. Further, even if there were
empirical evidence to that effect, courts should be wary of using
statistical evidence in determining custody cases, 19 particularly
because courts are supposed to determine which of the individuals
seeking custody in this case would best promote the interests of the
children before the court.
315. Constant A., 496 A.2d at 8.
316. See, e.g., Birdsall v. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that
court's decision to intervene must be based on affirmative showing of harm or likelihood
thereof).
317. See Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Mass. 1980) (finding that parental
unfitness depends on harmful parental behavior); see also S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879
(Alaska 1985) (finding lesbian mother acceptable as parent because child's development was
superb).
318. SeeFlaks, supra note 170, at 355 (finding no evidence suggesting that homosexual-reared
children are inferior to children raised by heterosexual parents); Stephen B. Pershing, "Entreat
Me Not to Leave Thee": Bottoms v. Bottoms and the Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 289, 309 (1994) (finding no data showing that children raised by
homosexual parents are harmed relative to their heterosexually-raised counterparts); Donald H.
Stone, The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody When One Parent Is Homosexual or Lesbian-An Empirical
Study, 23 SuFFoLK U. L REv. 711, 739 (1989) (concluding that gays and lesbians are emotionally
and psychologically equivalent to heterosexuals);Julia Frost Davies, Note, Two Monts and a Baby:
Protecting the Nontraditional Family Through Second Parent Adoptions, 29 Naiw ENG. L. Ruy. 1055,
1055 (1995) (concluding that children raised by lesbian parents develop normally).
319. See Branson v. Branson, 411 N.W.2d 395, 400 (N.D. 1987) (reversing custody award that
was based on statistical probability that one parent was less desirable parent because of her
childhood experiences).
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Regrettably, courts often are more interested in implementing their
own prejudices than in promoting the welfare of children. The court
in Constant A., for example, decided that because there was no
showing of harm to the child, 2' the lesbian mother merely should
have her visitation rights limited, rather than abrogated entirely."
Apparently, some courts are willing to abridge the fundamental rights
of parents without any evidence of actual or likely harm to their
children. 22
Courts may have irrational fears that a child who is raised by a gay
or lesbian parent may be harmed in any number of ways, empirical
evidence notwithstanding. For example, courts may fear that allowing
the child to be raised by a gay or lesbian parent will increase the
likelihood that the child will grow up-to be gay or lesbian.323 Yet,
there is nothing wrong with being gay or lesbian, and courts should
not make decisions on that basis. 24 In any event, children of gay
or lesbian parents are no more likely to be gay or lesbian than are
children of heterosexual parents."s Indeed, many experts have
found that children raised by lesbian or gay parents cannot be
distinguished from children raised by heterosexual parents with
respect to their gender identity.
3 2
320. See Constant A., 496 A.2d at 67-68.
321. See id. at 3 (considering mother's lesbian relationship only when considering whether
to limit, rather than to deny, visitation).
322. See Pershing, supra note 318, at 299 (noting that courts often rely on morality rather
than on factual showing of harm).
323. See Bennett v. O'Rourke, 1985 WL 3464, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985) ("In light
of the fact that here the homosexual parent and the minor child are both female, we consider
this factor particularly important because of the increased chance of role-modeling."); see also
Flaks, supra note 170, at 357 (pointing out that judges often fear that children raised by
homosexual parents will themselves become homosexual); Rosenblum, supra note 171, at 1673
(discussing court's concern that children will become gay or lesbian).
324. See Strasser, supra note 127, at 977 (stating that same-sex relationships are not immoral,
just as interracial relationships are not, possible majority views notwithstanding).
325. See State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1222 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (stating that incidence of homosexuality in children is same regardless of
parents' sexual orientation); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)
(takingjudicial notice that there is no consensus on cause of homosexuality, but that substantial
consensus exists that being raised by homosexual parent does not increase likelihood that child
will become homosexual); see also Flaks, supra note 170, at 369 (1994) (concluding that gay and
lesbian parents are no more likely to have gay or lesbian children than are heterosexual
parents); Stone, supra note 318, at 742 (arguing that homosexuality among children of gay and
lesbian parents is proportional to percentage in general population); Yvonne Tamayo, Sexuality,
Morality and the Law: The Custody Battle of a Non-Traditional Mother, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 853,860
(1994) (examining survey data indicating no correlation between sexual preference of parents
and that of their children); Ali, supra note 169, at 1017 (observing that parents' sexual
preference has no bearing on that of their children); Dooley, supranote 144, at 421 (noting that
children raised by homosexual parents are no more likely to become homosexual than are
children raised by heterosexual parents).
326. See Cabalquinto v. Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 890 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (Stafford,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging psychologist's testimony that sexual
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Other fears that courts may hold simply are unfounded. Children
of gay or lesbian parents are not more likely to be molested than are
children raised by heterosexual parents.3 27 Nor are such children
more likely to be harmed psychologically.3 2  Further, such children
are no less morally mature than are children of straight parents. 29
In fact, courts have every reason to believe that the children of gay
and lesbian parents will develop as successfully as will the children of
heterosexual parents.3 4°
Although courts may realize that the children themselves are no
more likely to be gay or lesbian if raised by a gay or lesbian parent,
they may fear that such children will be taught the "wrong" values;
however, there is no reason to believe that the values lesbian or gay
parents teach their children are inappropriate. Commitment, loyalty,
tolerance, and respect for self and others are appropriate values for
preference of child develops early in life and therefore would not be affected by father's
homosexuality); Elovitz, supra note 171, at 212 (finding that parent's sexual orientation has no
significant influence on gender role behavior); Tamayo, supra note 325, at 859-60 (examining
studies indicating that children of lesbian and heterosexual parents are equally as stable in terms
of gender identity).
327. SeeElovitz, supra note 171, at 216-17 (noting that sexual abuse of children is perpetrated
disproportionately by heterosexual men); Flaks, supra note 170, at 360 (observing that
homosexuals are no more likely than heterosexuals to molest children); Ali, supra note 169, at
1019 (suggesting that homosexuals are less apt to molest their children); Marilyn Riley, Note,
The Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional Challenge That Can No
Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 799, 853 (1975) (stating that experts have abandoned
myth about homosexuals and child molestation); Rosenblum, supra note 171, at 1684 (stating
that most child molestations are committed by heterosexual men with female victims); Wishard,
supra note 171, at 411 (pointing out that heterosexual men are more likely than homosexual
men to molest children).
328. See Flaks, supra note 170, at 371 (reviewing social science literature demonstrating that
homosexuals can raise psychologically healthy children); Parsons, supra note 126, at 473 (1994)
(noting that, according to recent studies, children are not psychologically harmed by fact that
parents are homosexual).
329. See Flaks, supra note 170, at 357 (finding that children raised by gays or lesbians had
perfectly normal moral maturity).
330. See Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements:
A ParadigmforReproductiveFreelom, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 183, 189 (1995) (noting that social
science and medical studies indicate no ill effects in children raised in homosexual households);
Charlotte Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science
Perspective, 2 DuKE J. GENDER, L. & POL'Y 191, 191 (1995) (observing no difference in
development of children raised by homosexual parents and those raised by heterosexual
parents); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. LJ. 459, 561-62
(1990). As Professor Polikoffnotes:
Research now exists on the psychological well-being of children raised by lesbian
mothers. This literature consistently points to two conclusions: (1) little difference
exists in the overall mental health of children raised in lesbian-mother households and
children raised in heterosexual-mother households; and (2) the quality of mothering,
not the mother's sexual orientation, is the most crucial factor for a child's healthy
growth and development.
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children to be taught."3 Even if there were reason to think that
questionable values were being taught in the home, 32 family
autonomy considerations presumably would prevent a denial of
custody on that basis.33
Surprisingly, some courts seem worried that gay and lesbian parents
will not teach their children bigoted values and explicitly reject the
idea that tolerance toward gays and lesbians should be promoted.3 4
Indeed, a parent may be penalized for not indicating a preference that
his or her child be heterosexual,335 even though parents cannot
determine their children's sexual orientation, assuming they desire to
do so.3 36 It goes without saying that a parent who indicates that it
would be desirable for his or her child to be gay or lesbian will not be
viewed with favor by many courts.337 Some courts do not seem
satisfied with gay or lesbian parents who express a preference that the
child be heterosexual, 3 s however, especially if the judge disapproves
of the parent's rationale behind the preference. A Missouri appellate
court, for example, was incredulous that the "only reason that [a gay
father] would prefer for his daughter to be heterosexual is because
of the attitude of society toward homosexuality."3 39
D. Teasing
Courts sometimes will consider whether the child's living with a
parent and that parent's same-sex partner would subject the child to
331. See Strasser, supra note 127, at 961.
332. See Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (suggesting that
father would impart questionable values such as belief that homosexuality was socially acceptable
alternative lifestyle).
333. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text (discussing family autonomy).
334. See Cabalquinto v. Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 890 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (Stafford,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A) child should be led in the way of
heterosexual preference, not be tolerant of [homosexuality]."); see also Dooley, supra note 144,
at 415-16 (explaining that many courts feel gay parents adversely affect morality of their children
by teaching them that being gay is not immoral).
335. See Roberts, 489 N.E.2d at 1069-70 (condemning father for his insistence that his children
need not be shielded from his alternative lifestyle, which he believed was socially acceptable);
see also Flaks, supra note 170, at 371 (noting that homosexual parents do not necessarily prefer
their children to be homosexual). But see Pershing, supra note 318, at 298 (contending that
states should not require parents, as condition of entrustment with their children's care, to teach
children particular views on sexuality).
336. See Troy R. Holroyd, Homosexuals and the Military: Integration or Discrimination?, 8 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 429, 447 (1992) (emphasizing that individual's sexual orientation
is forged early and is nearly impossible to alter).
337. See, eg.J.LP. (H.) v. DJ.P., 643 S.W.2d 865,872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (criticizing father's
attempt to persuade child of "desirability" of his lifestyle).
338. SeeJ.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
339. Id.
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teasing or social condemnation.' Courts, however, have rejected
social disapproval as a consideration in custody cases involving
interracial couples,"1 and it is not clear why consideration of public
opinion is any more appropriate in this situation. 42 Courts should
not take into account the popularity of a social group of which the
individual is a member when deciding something as important as
custody or visitation, although they sometimes do precisely that when
same-sex couples are involved.' Fortunately, some courts have
recognized that the bigotry of others toward gays and lesbians should
not be permitted to affect adversely a gay or lesbian parent's custody
of his or her child. 4"
Studies indicate that children of gay and lesbian parents tend not
to be teased about their parent's sexual orientation, and further, any
teasing that does occur is manageable by parent and child.'
Nonetheless, courts deny custody based on the speculation that such
340. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (stating that social stigma
attached to lesbianism may burden children raised in such environments).
341. See, e.g., Kramer v. Kramer, 297 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa 1980); Commonwealth ex reL
Myers v. Myers, 360 A.2d 587 (Pa. 1976); Commonwealth ex reL Lucas v. Kreischer, 299 A.2d 243
(Pa. 1973).
342. See Cox, supra note 98, at 784 (arguing that just as prejudice should not be a "driving
force" in custody determinations that involve interracial couples, it should not be a driving force
in custody determinations that involve gay or lesbian couples).
343. See Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to consider
unpopularity of homosexuality as factor in awarding of custody). But seejacobson v.Jacobson,
314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (fearing that social stigma of homosexuality may affect child
negatively). Unfortunately, courts often do consider the social popularity of parents. See S. v.
S., 608 S.W.2d 64,66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that community disapproval of lesbian mother
caused child to experience feelings of secrecy and isolation); S.E.G. v. R.AG., 735 S.W.2d 164,
166 (Mo. CL App. 1987) (hoping to protect children from peer pressure, teasing, and
ostracizing as result of mother's alternative lifestyle); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-I1, 1988 WL
30173, at *3 (Tenn Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) ("[If the child remains with her mother, she faces
a life that requires her to keep the secret of her mother's lifestyle, or face possible social
ostracism and contempt.").
344. See M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (suggesting that
community prejudice should no more adversely affect lesbian mother's right to custody than
rights of interracial couple); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding that
merits of custody arrangement should not be based on community's prejudice against same-sex
relationships just as it should not be based on community's prejudice against interracial
relationships); see also State Dep't of Health & Rehabitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1220
n.10 (Fla. 1995) (refusing to accept possibility of teasing as appropriate reason for banning
lesbian or gay adoption).
345. See Elovitz, supra note 171, at 215 (explaining that occasional incidents of teasing and
other forms of harassment have not been found to have significant impact on children
involved); Flaks, supra note 170, at 363 (noting that teasing of homosexually-reared children
generally is minimal); Stone, supra note 318, at 741 (contending that harassment of such
children is minimal and rarely has impact).
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teasing will occur" 6 or that the child will be forced to keep a secret
and thus be isolated from peers.347
Courts should not allow their policies on child custody to be
determined by private bigotry3' Doing so sends exactly the wrong
message to the children involved 49 and to society as a whole.350
Unfortunately, children are teased for a variety of reasons.3 51 As far
as the child's best interests are concerned, the most important
element is not whether the child will be teased, because most children
are teased in some way, but in how the teasing is handled.152
E. Criminal Behavior
Some courts continue to use the fact that sodomy technically
remains a "crime" in many states as an excuse for denying custody to
gay and lesbian parents.353 The same courts, however, deliberately
may look the other way when the "illegal" activity is heterosexual in
346. SeeDooley, supranote 144, at 417 (pointingout that courts usually assume homosexually
reared child will be victim of prejudice); Meyers, supra note 157, at 84344 (stating that fear of
harassment is mostly result of assumptions rather than grounded on actual evidence); see also
608 S.W.2d at 66 (predicting that teasing will occur). But see Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296
(Mass. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that teasing does not occur).
347. See 608 S.W.2d at 66 (noting that lesbianism of mother forces child to feel isolated and
secretive). But see Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321, 325 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that unless
parent's single-sex relationship is known to public, child likely will not suffer from societal
harassment).
348. See Wishard, supra note 171, at 418 (arguing that courts should not "legalize private
bias").
349. See 404 A.2d at 1263. The court in M.P. v. S.P. observed:
Taking the children from defendant can be done only at the cost of sacrificing those
very qualities they will find most sustaining in meeting the challenges inevitably ahead.
Instead of forbearance and feelings of protectiveness, it will foster in them a sense of
shame for their mother. Instead of courage and the precept that people of integrity
do not shrink from bigots, it counsels the easy option of shirking difficult problems
and following the course of expedience. Lastly, it diminishes their regard for the rule
of human behavior, everywhere accepted, that we do not forsake those to whom we are
indebted for love and nurture merely because they are held in low esteem by others.Id.
350. See Parsons, supra note 126, at 471 (contending that courts should not allow personal
biases to affect custody decisions).
351. See Elovitz, supra note 171, at 215 (suggesting that children with unique personal or
familial characteristics often are more likely to be teased); Polikoff, supra note 330, at 567-68
(explaining that children with unique physical and cultural traits often face adversity).
352. SeeTamayo, supra note 325, at 861 (pointing out that support of parent-in-care is crucial
to teased child); see also 404 A.2d at 1263 (noting that children raised in same-sex households
may be better equipped to make moral choices).
353. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (Cracraft,J.,
concurring) (stating that illegal acts of sodomy may factor into child custody decisions); Bottoms
v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 281 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (pointing out that trial judge based finding
of parental unfitness on fact that mother carried on open lesbian relationship in which she
engaged in illegal act of sodomy).
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nature."s ' The Bottoms court, for example, felt justified in question-
ing the lesbian mother and her partner about their sexual activity,
because sodomy was a crime in the state of Virginia. That court,
however, declined to ask the grandmother challenging custody about
her sexual relationship with a live-in boyfriend, even though fornica-
tion also was illegal in Virginia. 55 Furthermore, the court complete-
ly ignored the fact that many opposite-sex couples engage in
sodomitic practices,"' and that most states, including Virginia, that
criminalize sodomy, make it a crime whether it is performed by same-
sex or opposite-sex couples."5 7 Although it was likely that the grand-
mother also had committed "criminal behavior," the court found only
the lesbian mother's "criminal behavior" relevant to consider.
Ironically, the Virginia Supreme Court already had considered and
rejected the notion that one's status as a lawbreaker for committing
voluntary sodomitic acts made one per se unfit to be a parent. 5 8
The court feared that if people who had sodomitic relations were
unfit as a matter of law, the court also might have to declare anyone
who was a convicted murderer, rapist, robber, burglar, and so forth,
unfit as a matter of law.359  Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court
apparently believes that it is worse for a gay or lesbian parent than for
a convicted murderer or rapist to have custody of a child, fearing that
it cannot offer a principled distinction to protect the latter but not
the former16°
Courts are at best inconsistent with respect to which lawbreakers
should be prevented from retaining or acquiring custody. In Brown
v. Kittle,"'1 for example, the Virginia Supreme Court awarded
custody to a father who had kidnapped his son from the child's
354. See Cox v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 904 (Kogan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Fla. 1995) (finding it puzzling that, although
particular statute did not single out homosexuals, it was applied only to homosexuals).
355. See Tamayo, supra note 325, at 867 n.56 (pointing out that, although fornication was
illegal under Virginia law, trial judge failed to consider that behavior relevant).
356. See Pershing, supra note 318, at 295 (offering data stating that more than 90% of
heterosexual couples engage in oral sex).
357. See NoteJoint Adoption: A Queer Option?. 15 VT. L. REV. 197,209-10 (1990) (noting that
most states prohibit both opposite-sex and same-sex sodomy).
358. See Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 805 (Va. 1981).
359. See id.
360. Other courts suggest that as far as the child's welfare is concerned, it is as bad for the
parent's partner to be of the same sex as to be a child abuser. For example, a Missouri
appellate court compared a same-sex partner to "an habitual criminal, or a child abuser, or a
sexual pervert, or a known drug pusher," and reasoned that "to cut off association with such a
person as a condition to the child custody would be entirely reasonable." The court required
the parent to sever the relationship with her same-sex partner, despite there being no evidence
of wrongdoing. See N.K.M. v. LE.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
361. 303 S.E.2d 864, 865 (Va. 1983).
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mother who had had legal custody 62 The court justified its hold-
ing by pointing to the father's "genuine belief' that he was protecting
the child." The court chose to ignore evidence that the father
may have forced himself upon one of his sixteen-year-old stepdaugh-
ters, explaining that there had been some evidence that the sexual
relations had been "consensual."
3 4
Although some courts believe that there are crimes that "without
more, prove a person to be unfit to have the custody of his or her
minor children,"3 these courts are surprisingly strict with respect
to which crimes render a parent per se unfit. A California court, for
example, stated that even "[s] econd degree murder is not necessarily
among those,"" even if the victim is the mother of the children, unless
"the killing [was] accomplished in the presence of a child."367 In In
re Lutgen,3r an Illinois court awarded custody to a father who had
been convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the death of the child's
mother,369 despite evidence suggesting that he also had physically
abused his children."' 0 Here, the court gave great weight to the fact
that the children did not see their father kill their mother because he
had told the children to stay out of the living room so that they could
not watch.3
In Mason v. Moon,3 72 a Virginia appellate court reversed a lower
court's decision awarding custody to a mother who was married to the
man who had killed the child's father. Despite a counselor's report
expressing concern about the potential adverse psychological effect
on the child, the appellate court held that, absent extraordinary
evidence to the contrary, a mother's custody of her child should not
be severed.373 Two years later the same Virginia court, in Walker v.
Fagg,3 74 upheld a custody award to a man who had shot and killed
his wife.Y The father "had a history of alcohol abuse, spousal
362. See Brown v. Kittle, 303 S.E.2d 864, 865 (Va. 1983).
363. See id at 867.
364. See id. at 865; see also In reL, 526 P.2d 491,493 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (rejecting assertion
that husband was unfit to have custody for arguably having had consensual sexual relations with
16-year-old daughter).
365. Detrich v. Sergio M., 135 Gal. Rptr. 222, 228 (Ct. App. 1976).
366. 1d at 229.
367. Id
368. 532 N.E.2d 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
369. See In re Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d 976, 985 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
370. See id. at 978-79.
371. See id. at 978.
372. 385 S.E.2d 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
373. See Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242, 245 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
374. 400 S.E.2d 208 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
375. See Walter v. Fagg, 400 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
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abuse, unemployment and general family neglect,"376 but the court
nonetheless was willing to award him custody. Thus, the state of
Virginia does not believe that killing a child's mother is a sufficient
reason to deny custody,377 although it is willing to remove a child
from the custody of a lesbian mother without evidence that the
mother's lesbianism would harm the child,3 78 even if the child
thereby would be awarded to the grandmother who was living in an
"immoral" relationship with a man who had been accused of
molesting her daughter. 9
Laws prohibiting consensual conduct between adults rarely, if ever,
are enforced.' A Massachusetts appellate court argued that for
adoption purposes "a criminal statute [that] is wholly ignored is the
same as no statute at all."38' The court then recommended that the
custodial award be based solely on the best interests of the child,
ignoring the illicit aspect of the parent's conduct just as it would "if
the statutes were removed from the books."38 2
There is no reason to believe that Virginia is any different from
most states in which sodomy laws "are never, or substantially never,
made the subject of prosecution." 3 Such laws might be enforced
if a minor is involved," if force is used,' or if payment is ten-
dered.3 86  Enforcement of sodomy laws against adults who engage
in consensual sodomy, however, is extremely rare.38 7 Virginia,
376. Id, at 210.
377. See Parsons, supra note 126, at 464 (discussing Virginia ruling in favor of natural parent
who had married murderer of child's father).
378. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 109 (Va. 1995) (Keenan, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with court's finding because record failed to show that mother's homosexual
conduct was harmful to child).
379. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 278-79 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that
mother was sexually abused by grandmother's live-in boyfriend as child), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102
(Va. 1995).
380. See Fort v. Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754, 758 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (pointing out that
fornication, adultery, and lewd and lascivious cohabitation statutes rarely are enforced).
381. Id. at 758-59. But see Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1975) (noting that
absence of criminal enforcement of homosexual acts does not mean that children should be
exposed to homosexuality in their formative years). The Chaffin court was laboring under a
variety of misapprehensions. See supra notes 323-39 and accompanying text (discussing typical
misconceptions under which courts decide).
382. Fort, 425 N.E.2d at 758-59.
383. I& at 758.
384. See Shull v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 133 (Va. 1994) (affirming conviction of woman
found to have engaged in oral sex with minor boy).
385. See Love v. Commonwealth, 441 S.E.2d 709 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding forcible
sodomy conviction).
386. See Shurbaji v. Commonwealth, No. 1822-92-4, 1994 WL 102179 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 29,
1994) (affirming defendant's conviction for pandering).
387. A possible example involves an individual convicted of consensual sodomy. SeeYeatts
v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 254,266 (Va. 1991) (mentioning felony conviction ofconsensual
sodomy). Because the conviction was mentioned in a case involving only the individual's
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therefore, has used a law that rarely, if ever, is enforced to deprive a
mother of custody when the mother had neither been charged nor
convicted of that offense and when no evidence was presented that
her relationship caused or will cause harm to the child." The
same state, however, may award custody of children to the person
convicted of having killed their mother.
F Presumptions
Many states take the position espoused by a New York appellate
court with respect to custody and orientation. In Anonymous v.
Anonymous,"8 9 the court held that, without proof that a child has
been affected adversely, sexual preference does not render an
individual unfit to be a parent.30  Some states, however, use a
different standard. Although not holding that gay or lesbian
individuals are per se unfit to parent,3 91 some states employ a
rebuttable presumption that a gay or lesbian parent should not have
custody of a child.392
A presumption that is rebuttable in theory might be treated in fact
as if it were a per se ban.3 93 By the same token, a court that claims
to treat orientation as one factor among many in a custody determina-
tion may consider it, in fact, the sole relevant factor. For example, in
G.A. v. D.A.,3' a Missouri appellate court held that the mother's
lesbianism "tipped the scales" to indicate that the child's best interests
would be served by awarding custody to the father,395 although there
is reason to believe that the mother's lesbianism was considered so
weighty that very few things could have outweighed it.9 ' The
dissent compared the two would-be homes. The mother had a steady
nursing job, provided the child with his own room in a well-kept
murder conviction, the case was not described in full detail. Further, given the individual's
violent history, he may have been convicted of consensual sodomy because it would have been
too difficult to prove the lack of consent. See Greene v. United States, 571 A.2d 218 (D.C. 1990)
(affirming sodomy conviction despite acquittal for rape).
388. See supra notes 372-73 and accompanying text.
389. 503 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1986).
390. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 503 N.Y.S.2d 466, 467 (App. Div. 1986).
391. See Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to find that
gay father is per se unfit).
392. Constant A. v. Paul CA., 496 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding presumption in
favor of traditional heterosexual relationship); see also Parsons, supra note 126, at 472 (explaining
how homosexuality often creates rebuttable presumption of parental unfitness).
393. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 109 (Va. 1995) (Keenan, J., dissenting) ("The
record plainly shows that the trial court made a per se finding of unfitness based on the
mother's homosexual conduct.").
394. 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
395. G.A. v. DA, 745 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
396. See id. at 729 (Lowenstein,J., dissenting).
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house, and enrolled him in pre-school." On the other hand, the
father lived in a one room cabin, had limited education, survived on
a $6500 yearly income, and provided the child with a fold-up cot and
a play area littered with beer cans.39  The dissent concluded, "If
there has been any doubt as to the issue of homosexuality being an
absolute or conclusive presumption of detriment, the result in this
case on these facts dispels that doubt-"3"
Courts seem not to appreciate that their willingness to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation, despite the absence of any actual
or likely harm to the child, will have foreseeable negative consequenc-
es for the very children whose best interests the courts are supposed
to be promoting. Children may suffer in two ways: (1) a much worse
parent may get custody; or (2) the lesbian or gay parent may fail to
bring serious matters of concern to the attention of the courts for fear
that the court will modify custody or visitation."
IV. JUDICIAL DISCRETION
It is not hard to understand why trial courts are given a great deal
of discretion in custody cases. As a North Carolina appellate court
observed, "The trial judge has the opportunity to see the parties in
person and to hear the witnesses."40' The court "can detect tenors,
tones and flavors that are lost in the bare printed record read months
later by appellate judges." 2 The appellate court concluded that
unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion, the trial court's
decision should not be reversed. 3  An Illinois appellate court
referred to the trial court's "superior vantage point, which cannot be
reproduced from the cold record to observe and judge the witnesses'
demeanor and credibility."4 4  Because the appellate court can
review only the record, the trial court is "in a better position to
397. See id. at 729 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting).
398. See id. (Lowenstein,J., dissenting).
399. Id. at 728 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting).
400. Clearly, gay or lesbian parents have good reason to believe that they have much to lose,
even if their cause is just, if their orientation will be held against them despite its having no
adverse effect on the child. See e.g., M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1260 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979) (mother files to compel father to pay owed support and father counters by moving for
change in custody); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (mother charges abuse
and father counters with motion to modify custody); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-11, 1988 WL
30173, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (mother seeks to compel payment of support and
father counters for change in custody).
401. Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849, 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
402. Id
403. See id.
404. In reMarriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281, 291 (Ill. Ct  App. 1991).
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evaluate the credibility, temperaments, personalities, and capabilities
of both parents."405
Custody should not be used to penalize or reward parents for their
conduct."6 Yet, trial courts may be punishing gay and lesbian
parents by awarding custody of their children to others, the best
interests of the children notwithstanding, and appellate courts are
unwilling to overturn these judgments out of deference to judicial
discretion. In D.H. v. JH.,°' for example, an Indiana appellate
court upheld a lower court's award of custody to the father over a
lesbian mother, despite evidence of clear error by the trial court.4 °"
There was no properly admitted evidence of homosexual activity by
the mother in the presence of her children, nor was there evidence
that the children were adversely affected by her homosexuality."9
The trial court, however, admitted inadmissible hearsay evidence
regarding the mother's alleged homosexual activity4 10 and made
disparaging remarks about homosexuality.411
Although recognizing that "homosexuality standing alone without
evidence of any adverse effect upon the welfare of the child does not
render the homosexual parent unfit as a matter of law to have custody
of the child,"412 the appellate court found that the trial court might
have made the same decision on different grounds, namely, the
contested testimony41' that the wife's housekeeping standards were
not "proper," that the husband sometimes had fixed meals for the
children, and that the husband sometimes had assisted the children
with their lessons.4  The court gave substantial deference to the
trial judge's ability to exclude extraneous and irrelevant evidence,415
and refused to consider that the trial court's obvious animus toward
lesbians and gays could be a sufficient reason to remand the case to
a different judge for a new trial, because it "is only when the trial
405. Id.
406. See Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (stating that child
must not be used to punish or reward conduct); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1987) (asserting that custody is not used to reward or punish parents for their
conduct).
407. 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
408. See D.H. v.J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
409. See id.
410. See id. at 294.
411. See id. at 293-94.
412. I& at 293.
413. See id. at 289.
414. See id. at 296.
415. See id. at 293.
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judge's judgment has apparently or obviously been infected by
erroneously admitted evidence that we will set it aside. 416
Appellate courts, however, should be less deferential when there is
evidence that a trial judge has allowed his or her personal prejudices
to bias the application of the "best interest" standard.4 17  Had a
lower court manifested prejudice on the basis of race, the court
presumably would have remanded the case for a new trial by a
different judge.418
It is eminently clear that some judges enforce their own stereotypes
and prejudices,419 best interests of the child notwithstanding.420
In M.P v. S.P.,42 1 the trial court reassigned custody from the mother
to the father because the mother was a lesbian. 422  The record
indicated that the mother had "done all that can be expected of a
dutiful mother."4' Indeed, working part-time so that she could
meet with various specialists to help her daughter, she had more than
met that standard. 24 Even though the father had at one point
falsely denied paternity of one of his daughters,4  the trial court
nonetheless was willing to award him custody.
In In re Cabalquinto,426 a Washington state trial judge expressed his
personal bias against homosexual living arrangements, suggesting
that "a child should be led in the way of heterosexual preference, not
be tolerant of [homosexuality]" and that "it can[not] do the boy any
good to live in such an environment [and] might do some harm. "427
As a result of these references to homosexuality, the Washington
Supreme Court remanded the case-but to the same judge.428 Certain-
ly, the appellate court should not have allowed the opinion to stand,
given the judge's obvious bias. But, by remanding the case to the
416. Id. at 294.
417. See Rosenblum, supra note 171, at 1666 (noting that judges often inject biases about
societal norms and morality into formulation of "best interest of child" standard); see also
Patricia Leitch, Note, Custody: Lesbian Mothers in the Courts, 16 GONz. L. REv. 147, 152 (1980)
(describing factors courts use in determining child's best interest).
418. See Edel v. Edel, 293 N.W.2d 792 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (remanding case to newjudge
because of inappropriate consideration of race).
419. SeeAli, supra note 169, at 1012 (explaining that courts, by possessing broad discretion
in applying "best interests" test, often allow prejudices and misconceptions to factor into
decisions); Evans, supra note 301, at 649-50 (discussing misconceptions).
420. See Cox, supra note 98, at 782 (arguing that courts, by relying on moral imperatives, not
only enforce stereotypes but also may fail to provide for child's best interests).
421. 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
422. See M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1259 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
423. Id. at 1258.
424. See id.
425. See id.
426. 669 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
427. In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
428. See id.
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same judge, the appellate court gave the lower court an opportunity
to reach the same result, for the same reason, although this time
perhaps being more careful in what was expressed in the written
opinion. Certainly, it is not desirable to have judges secretly allowing
their bias to shape results. 29 Yet, a mere winking or, worse, approv-
al of such comments is hardly appropriate. Ratherjudges should be
condemned for homophobic statements, and remand in such
circumstances should be to a different judge."3 Given the wide
discretion afforded judges in custody disputes, judges should be
required to justify their rulings in terms of specified factors.432 That
way, gay or lesbian parents who lose their children in custody disputes
will not have to wonder whether they have been victimized by a
quietly biased judge. 3
Appellate courts do not always defer to a trial court's judgment.
For example, in Glover v. Glover,' an Ohio appellate court rejected
a trial court's custodial award, holding that the mother should be the
custodial parent.435 Perhaps the mother should have had custo-
dy,43 6 although the court implied that whenever two fit individuals
vie for custody, the award always should be made to the heterosexual
rather than the homosexual parent. 3 7  This does not inspire
confidence in the court's objectivity or in its commitment to the
promotion of the child's interests, especially when the appellate court had
to overturn the trier offact about who would make a better parent.
The opinions of various trial and appellate courts give reason to
believe that gay and lesbian parents will not be treated fairly in the
courts. For example, a Missouri appellate court reassured a lesbian
mother that although it recognized that "homosexual practices have
been condemned since the beginning of recorded history,"43 the
429. See Constant A. v. Paul CA, 496 A.2d. 1, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (preferring that trial
judge express, rather than conceal, moral beliefs).
430. See Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 642 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (expressing
unhappiness with trialjudge's homophobic comments).
431. See id. at 643 (reversing trial court's denial of mother's motion for change of venue).
432. See Russman, supra note 159, at 42-43 (discussing state attempts to limit courts to certain
factors); see also In reWilliam S., 75 Ohio St. 3d 95, 98-99 (1996) (finding that parental rights
may not be terminated unless at least one statutory condition is met).
433. See In re Marriage of Cupples, 531 N.W.2d 656, 657 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting
lesbian mother's contention that district court placed undue emphasis on sexual orientation).
434. 586 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
435. See Glover v. Glover, 586 N.E.2d 159, 164 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that trial
court abused discretion by failing to consider wife's role as primary caretaker). But see i.-
(discussing expert's recommendation that husband be granted custody).
436. See id.
437. See id. at 165 (noting that, unlike situation in which gay man was permitted to adopt
child when no alternative existed, this case contained viable custodial alternatives).
488. L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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court viewed homosexuals with "bewildered compassion."439  It
would be difficult to believe that a lesbian or gay party appearing
before such a court would receive equal treatment, bewildered
compassion notwithstanding.
Apparently, some judges do not believe that gays and lesbians
should be treated equally by the courts. In Chicoine v. Chicoine,"6
one South Dakota Supreme Court judge, citing the Bible and the
Egyptian Book of the Dead,"' openly disapproved of what he referred
to as "a transitory phenomenon on the American scene that homosex-
uality is okay."" 2 This concurring judge would have curtailed all of
the mother's visitation rights until she was "no longer a lesbian living
a life of abomination."' 3
In Chicoine, the trial court had granted unsupervised, overnight
visitation provided that no gay or lesbian individuals were in the
children's presence." On appeal, the state high court thought the
visitation restrictions too liberal." In what might be described
charitably as an unusual requirement, the state high court insisted
that, should the trial court persist in granting overnight visitation, that
court also should provide adequate enforcement measures to ensure
compliance." 6
The point here is not that every parent has a right to unsupervised,
overnight visitation, but merely that limitations should be rationally
related to the existing conditions 7 and should not be motivated by
clear prejudice.' When a court cares more about imposing its own
moral views than about promoting the best interests of the children,
which it has a duty to protect, all stand to lose.
439. Id,
440. 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992).
441. See Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 897 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., specially
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Leviticus 18:22).
442. Id. (Henderson,J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).
443. Id. at 896 (Henderson,J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).
444. See id. at 892-93.
445. See id. at 894.
446. See it.
447. See North v. North, 648 A.2d 1025, 1032 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (explaining that
visitation and overnight restrictions should reflect facts contained in record).
448. SeeJohnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 838 (N.D. 1993) (Levine, J., concurring)
("There is no-one who would disagree that our courtrooms should be safe havens from the glut
of prejudice that festers in the outside world. Accordingly, homophobia has no place in our
system or in ourjurisprudence."); Note, supra note 357, at 205 (observing that homophobia is
widespread throughout legal system).
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CONCLUSION
Parents have a fundamental right to the care and companionship
of their children. Absent a showing of unfitness, neglect, or abandon-
ment, courts are extremely reluctant to terminate parental rights.
When lesbian or gay parents are involved, however, some state courts
are remarkably willing to limit or terminate parental rights, even
absent a showing of probable harm.
Courts limiting or terminating lesbian or gay parental rights claim
to be preventing likely future emotional or moral harm to the
children; however, empirical data belie those claims. Further, if
courts really were interested in preventing probable future harm, they
would be much less willing, for example, to grant custody of children
to the individual who had killed their mother.
Appellate courts sometimes are remarkably deferential when
considering trial court custodial awards, even when the record shows
that the trial judge made prejudicial comments. When trial courts
award custody or liberal visitation rights to lesbian or gay parents,
some appellate and supreme courts suddenly are much less willing to
adopt a deferential stance.
Courts making or countenancing biased comments or custodial
awards help bring about a variety of negative consequences. They
may: (1) harm innocent parents and children by causing the wrong
parent to have custody; (2) undermine confidence in those decisions
that have been decided correctly by planting the seeds of suspicion
that courts cannot be disinterested and objective in certain types of
cases; and (3) induce parents to avoid the courts to contest inappro-
priate visitation or custody arrangements, for example, for fear that
even worse arrangements would be made. Courts that implicitly claim
that these foreseeable negative consequences are outweighed by the
benefit of promoting prejudice and intolerance will succeed only in
further undermining public confidence in the courts and in promot-
ing divisiveness in society. These judicial attitudes, messages, and
practices must stop-for the sake of innocent parents and children,
the judicial system, and society as a whole.

